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ABSTRACT
Three Essays on Interconnectedness Between Forms of Organizational Learning
by
John S. Chen
Co-Chairs: Gautam Ahuja and Hart Posen
This dissertation builds from the observation that organizational learning takes on
multiple forms or dimensions, many of which are interconnected. It comprises three
essays that explore the implications of this observation for (1) the dynamics of entry
within an industry, (2) cooperation, often among rivals, in an industry, and (3) the
riskiness of decision-making within a firm, respectively.
The first essay theorizes a process whereby external knowledge is used in the
process of experiential learning. This represents a departure from most prior work,
which typically treats vicarious and experiential learning dichotomously. The key
implication of this mechanism is that it represents a means by which entrants hold a
learning advantage over incumbents, as this essay empirically demonstrates using a
full census of U.S. banks.
The second essay proposes a linkage between knowledge generated by a group
of collaborating firms and knowledge internal to the firm: firms contribute their
internal knowledge to a collaboration as a vehicle for interacting with other firms
and absorb knowledge on other firms’ contributions. By contributing, firms therefore
build a collaboration-specific absorptive capacity. In contrast to prior conceptions
x
of absorptive capacity, the knowledge that facilitates knowledge absorption is visible
to all firms, and as such, high levels of knowledge contributions potentially reveal
valuable strategic information to partnering firms. These hypotheses are tested using
detailed meeting level data from the wireless industry.
In contrast to the focus on learning sources in the first two essays, the third
essay examines inter-temporal interconnections in a firm’s learning objectives. In
particular, the study examines the linkage between exploration prior to the emergence
of a problem and the need to manage the riskiness of adaptation afterwards. While
exploration indeed provides knowledge that guides post-problem adaptation, which
reduces the risk of searching over alternatives of di↵ering and otherwise unknown
quality, we show that exploration also skews firms’ preferences towards solutions that
in and of themselves have higher performance variation. As such, exploration can in
fact increase the risk of problem-solving e↵orts. The arguments and findings for this




This dissertation investigates interconnectedness among distinct forms of organi-
zational learning across three studies that examine the implications of this intercon-
nectedness for (1) the dynamics of entry within an industry, (2) cooperation, often
among rivals, in an industry, and (3) the riskiness of decision-making within a firm.
While interconnectedness among learning modes is somewhat abstract in an organi-
zational setting, it is perhaps easier to see at an individual level, such as in the game
of chess. Learning in chess takes on multiple, interdependent forms. For instance,
learning through experience cannot be considered in isolation from learning through
others because the scenarios a player learns to play depend on situations partially dic-
tated by her opponents and, conversely, what the player learns from her opponents
depends on her own understanding of chess strategy from prior experience. As an-
other example, vicarious learning may also come through teachers, but the teacher’s
knowledge may be challenging to internalize absent the student encountering real
game situations that trigger a need to learn responses. Finally, learning to manage
risk in chess play depends partially on the sources of vicarious learning. A player
may wish to learn low-risk chess strategies, but her playing environment – that is,
the playing style of the opponents she tends to face – may dictate that the optimal
strategies for her to learn are instead risky ones (i.e., strategies leading to many wins
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and losses, but few draws).
In the first study, Hart Posen and I examine interconnectedness between experi-
ential and vicarious learning. In particular, we argue a learning mechanism by which
external knowledge facilitates the process of experiential learning, which stands in
contrast to the separable treatment of vicarious and experiential learning mecha-
nisms typically seen in prior research. While a firm’s ability to absorb (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990) – that is, comprehend and assimilate – external knowledge is central
to prior literature’s explanations for the extent of vicarious learning, it is not a firm’s
ability but rather the impetus to gain external knowledge that is central under the
mechanism proposed in this study.
As such, we propose that entrants benefit more than incumbents from learning at
the intersection of own experience and external knowledge. An important implica-
tion of this proposition is that it helps explain the preponderance of successful entry
in most industries (Geroski, 1995), despite entrants su↵ering a “liability of newness”
(Stinchcombe, 1965) in that they rarely have the knowledge and capabilities at found-
ing to survive and have limited ability to absorb knowledge from others. While radical
innovation by entrants o↵ers a compelling explanation (Henderson, 1993; Reinganum,
1983; Schumpeter, 1934), Geroski’s study also finds significant successful entry in the
numerous industries marked almost exclusively by incremental innovations. It is in
these contexts where the proposed mechanism of learning at the intersection of own
experience and external knowledge perhaps holds the most explanatory power for how
entrants “catch up” to incumbents and become viable within an industry.
In the second study, I examine interconnectedness between internal learning –
that is, learning facilitated by internal experience or prior knowledge – and learn-
ing through multi-firm collaborations, such as research consortia or standardization
bodies. Internal and collaborative learning processes are rarely considered interde-
pendently in the multi-firm collaboration (and dyadic collaboration) literature. For
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example, the research consortia literature considers internal and collaborative learn-
ing as distinct and largely independent modes (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Katz,
1986; Sakakibara, 2003). In contrast, I theorize a process by which knowledge shar-
ing in a collaboration enhances a firm’s (collaboration-specific) absorptive capacity,
which in turn facilitates firm-level learning.
This process implies that knowledge contributions to a collaboration enhance the
performance of a firm’s innovations that build on knowledge generated by the col-
laboration. However, we further theorize that this beneficial e↵ect of knowledge
contributions is limited: higher levels of contribution may signal to other firms infor-
mation, such as technology focus or expectations of the collaboration’s benefits, that
intensifies the competition for post-collaborative innovations.
In contrast to the first two studies examining interconnectedness among knowledge
sources for learning, the third study, which I jointly conducted with Hart Posen, ex-
amines the inter-temporal interconnectedness among a firm’s objectives for learning.
In particular, we examine the linkage between exploration prior to the emergence of a
problem and the need to manage the riskiness of adaptation afterwards. We challenge
the seemingly obvious prescription that increased exploration of contingent actions
prior to the emergence of a problem reduces the risk associated with solving the prob-
lem. Using a computational bandit model (Gittins and Jones, 1979), we show that
while this exploration indeed provides knowledge that guides an otherwise blind and
hence risky search for solutions to the problem, it also biases firms towards riskier
solutions.
This study extends prior work showing how endogenous risk aversion emerges from
risk-neutral search (March, 1996) and implications thereof (Denrell and March, 2001).
In contrast to this prior research, wherein risk aversion emerges from a search for the
best alternative in a stable, problem-free environment, we show how risk seeking in
problem-solving emerges as a byproduct of pre-problem search. In particular, risk
3
seeking emerges from alternatives tried and discarded prior to the occurrence of a




An Advantage of Newness: Vicarious Learning
Despite Limited Absorptive Capacity
2.1 Introduction
New entrants are endowed with the pre-entry knowledge of their founders (Agar-
wal et al., 2004; Dencker et al., 2009; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Huber, 1991).
However, this knowledge alone is often insu cient to generate the performance lev-
els necessary to survive. Indeed, entrants appear to su↵er a “liability of newness”
(Stinchcombe, 1965), which has been attributed to factors including a lack of re-
sources, limited organizational knowledge and capabilities, and underdeveloped orga-
nizational practices. Entrants can bridge the gap between their initial endowments
and the capabilities necessary to compete e↵ectively by learning vicariously from the
knowledge of incumbents. But given the important role of absorptive capacity (Co-
hen and Levinthal, 1990), how can entrants learn vicariously when they lack stocks of
prior related knowledge at founding? In answering this question, we theorize that the
process of experiential learning facilitates vicarious learning, particularly for entrants.
Organizations, both entrants and incumbents, seek to learn directly from their
own experience (Argote, 1999; Lieberman, 1984; March and Olsen, 1975) and vicar-
iously from the knowledge and experience of rivals (Levitt and March, 1988; Miner
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and Haunschild, 1995; Posen et al., 2013). Progress in understanding organizational
learning has been facilitated by the assumption that experiential learning and vicar-
ious learning are independent processes. Studies have typically focused on one mode
of learning alone, whereas those that examine both modes simultaneously treat them
as theoretically additive(Argote et al., 1990; Herriott et al., 1985).
Building on recent research that relaxes the assumption of independence (Baum
and Dahlin, 2007; Schwab, 2007; Simon and Lieberman, 2010), our central thesis is
that, particularly for entrants, experiential learning and vicarious learning are more
closely related than prior research suggests. Conditional on the size of the pool of
external knowledge available, the amount of vicarious learning is a function of both
the capacity to absorb external knowledge and the impetus to obtain it (Greve, 2005).
This implies two mechanisms through which experiential learning may facilitate vi-
carious learning. The first mechanism derives from the observation that the outcome
of experiential learning augments a firm’s knowledge stock. An absorptive capacity
logic (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) suggests that the ability to learn vicariously is en-
hanced by accumulated experience, which facilitates the identification and utilization
of external knowledge.
The second mechanism, which is the main focus of our attention, derives from
the observation that experiential learning is a process as well as an outcome. This
suggests a far richer interaction between experiential and vicarious learning. Central
to our theory is a “problem” (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Nickerson et al., 2012).
Experiential learning occurs when, in the course of engaging in productive activity,
problems are identified, experiments are performed as solutions are sought, and solu-
tions are implemented (Arrow, 1962; March and Olsen, 1975). These problem-solving
attempts do not happen in a vacuum, isolated from the knowledge and experience
of others. Many solutions to problems are stimulated by learning about what other
firms do. Thus, problems that arise in the process of experiential learning trigger a
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search for external knowledge, such that vicarious learning occurs as a by-product
of the ongoing process of experiential learning. The strength of this mechanism is a
decreasing function of a firm’s existing stock of problem-solving knowledge. As such,
the impact of experiential learning as a facilitator of vicarious learning is relatively
small for incumbents, but it is a significant driver of entrants’ learning. In this sense,
entrants enjoy an advantage of newness.
To illustrate the intersection of experiential and vicarious learning, consider the
example of an entrant engaged in the manufacture of mobile phones.1 After com-
mencing initial production, the entrant observes higher defect rates than anticipated.
Testing reveals signal strength varies widely across units. The firm must solve the
problem rapidly, but there are many potential causes of the excess defects, such as
management practices, employee skills, production planning, production processes,
and product design. The entrant initially attempts to draw from its own production
knowledge for guidance in identifying a solution. When this internal knowledge is
unavailable to solve the problem, the entrant seeks knowledge outside the firm. It
begins by disassembling competitors’ phones to compare signal quality at various in-
ternal design points, and in doing so, it discovers simple di↵erences in the production
process that account for the problem. Here, a problem encountered in the experiential
learning process directs vicarious learning since there are too many potential prob-
lems with the phone (or any other complex product) for a firm to solve proactively
(that is, absent the problems actually occurring).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we review
the literatures on experiential and vicarious learning. Then we more fully develop
our theory at their intersection and implications for di↵erences between entrants and
incumbents. Next, we describe our empirical setting: the U.S. commercial banking
1This illustration reflects a real problem encountered during a prior career, though some minor
details have been modified to protect the identity of the firm and more clearly convey the theoretical
mechanisms.
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industry from 1984 to 1998. In this context, we are able to construct learning curves
for a complete census of firms. We then present our empirical analysis, in which
we examine problems that arise in the experiential learning process and identify the
extent to which they trigger vicarious learning by entrants and incumbents. Finally,
we o↵er concluding remarks, including contributions to the broader literature on
organizational learning.
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses
In this study, we focus attention on the intersection of two types of organizational
activities oriented toward the accumulation of knowledge: experiential learning and
vicarious learning. These mechanisms of learning share a common foundation in
that they attempt to replicate one’s own, or others’, successful choices and to avoid
those choices proven unsuccessful (March, 2010). We begin with a brief discussion of
the theoretical basis of the two types of learning and then present our argument for
learning at their intersection.
2.2.1 Experiential Learning
An organization learns from its own experience. Experiential learning can be con-
ceptualized as a history-dependent process in which adjustments to organizational
practices are based, in part, on knowledge accumulated during an organization’s past
experience (Herriott et al., 1985; March and Olsen, 1975). Consider an organization
engaged in day-to-day productive activity. The management of the organization can
be conceptualized as choosing among alternative ways of performing a task (Her-
riott et al., 1985; March, 2010). An alternative may represent a single organizational
choice, but more generally, it represents a configuration of choices governing how the
organization engages in productive activity. March (2010, p. 16) described organiza-
tions that “(1) act by choosing an alternative from among those available, (2) record
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a result and evaluate it in terms of its success, (3) replicate the choice of alternatives
associated with successes ...”
Thus, the locus of attention in experiential learning is a problem that emerges in
the process of engaging in productive activity and the subsequent search for solutions
(Arrow, 1962; March and Olsen, 1975). A problem emerges when performance falls
below expectations. Performance may be defined along various dimensions such as
financial indicators (e.g., sales, return on assets), design/manufacturing metrics (e.g.,
defect rates, productivity), or consumer satisfaction. Expectations are set relative
either to an organization’s own past performance or to the performance of a suitable
reference group such as other firms in the industry (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve,
1998). For example, in a field study, von Hippel and Tyre (1995) documented one
firm’s experiential learning in circuit board manufacturing. A problem was identified
when a production step required more time and e↵ort than expected based on the
firm’s prior experience with similar tasks. The solution involved a minor software
change that streamlined the production step.
In practice, experiential learning is not as simple as these descriptions suggest and
is indeed subject to uncertainty, ambiguity, bias, and error (Levinthal and March,
1993; Levitt and March, 1988). However, there is significant evidence of its general
e cacy. The most prominent evidence is in the large body of work on organizational
learning curves. These studies relate the unit cost of production to cumulative output
(as a measure of experience). Studies find that firms progress along learning curves in
which their performance improves at a decreasing rate with output (see Argote, 1999,
for a review). Learning curves have been observed across a variety of industries (e.g.,
aircraft, trucking, chemicals, semiconductors), dimensions of performance (e.g., costs,
recalls, customer satisfaction, survival), and levels of analysis (e.g., groups, plants,
firms). Research in this domain tends to model learning curves with a power law





where C is cost, A is the cost corresponding to the first unit of experience, X is a
cumulative experience measure, and  x is the rate of experiential learning;  x < 0
implies cost reduction and, hence, learning.
2.2.2 Vicarious Learning from External Knowledge
Organizations learn not only from their own experience but also from the knowl-
edge of others (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Levitt and March, 1988; Miner and
Haunschild, 1995). In the innovation literature, vicarious learning occurs through
spillovers (i.e., unintended leakage) of technical knowledge (Griliches, 1998). In early
research, Griliches (1957) studied the di↵usion of hybrid corn. Subsequently, a large
body of research examined research and development (R&D) spillovers across a va-
riety of industries, including semiconductors (Appleyard, 1996) and pharmaceuticals
(Furman et al., 2006).
Studies of vicarious learning, many outside the realm of R&D, posit two types of
knowledge conduits between firms. First, knowledge may be acquired by observing
artifacts of rivals’ internal activities. Baum and Ingram (1998, p. 1000) found that
Manhattan hotels learn by observing rivals’ practices through visits that “start at the
roof and go to the basement...” Similarly, Haunschild and Miner (1997) demonstrated
that firms learn from observing rivals’ choices of investment bankers, Simon and
Lieberman (2010) demonstrated that magazine publishers learn from observing rivals’
websites, and Gittelman and Kogut (2003) showed that firms learn by observing rivals’
patents and publications.
Second, knowledge may be acquired directly from rivals’ employees. The most
direct of these mechanisms is employee mobility (Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010;
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003) and board interlocks (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998).
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Less direct are knowledge flows facilitated by industry social forums, including trade
association meetings and industry conferences (Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999). Knowl-
edge flows may also occur in less formal settings. Ingram and Roberts (2000) studied
knowledge flows through the social relations of Sydney hotel managers, and Saxenian
(1996) studied the technological community in Silicon Valley.
A salient feature of many of these studies is that (substantial) absorptive capacity
is not always necessary. For example, in Baum and Ingram’s (1998) Manhattan hotel
study, general powers of observation were su cient to facilitate learning through visits
to rivals’ establishments. Similarly, Simon and Lieberman (2010, p. 138) noted that
magazine publishers’ websites are “easily observable” and that “many websites are
developed and operated by third parties who can transmit information from early
adopters to late adopters.”
Following standard convention in productivity studies (see Griliches, 1998, for





where C is cost of production, K is a measure of the external knowledge pool, A
is a constant, and  k is interpreted as the rate of vicarious learning from external
knowledge;  k < 0 implies that unit production costs are smaller in contexts where
the pool of external knowledge is larger.
The cost reductions realized at the intersection of experiential and vicarious learn-
ing are modeled by combining Equations 2.1 and 2.2, which reflects a simple Cobb-
Douglas form, such that2
2Typically, Cobb-Douglas exponents are positive and less than one to reflect positive but dimin-







2.2.3 Intersection of Experiential and Vicarious Learning
Progress in understanding organizational learning has been facilitated by the as-
sumption of an artificial divide between experiential and vicarious learning. Many
studies have focused on either experiential or vicarious learning alone, whereas others
have examined them additively (Argote et al., 1990; Baum et al., 2000; Ingram and
Simons, 2002). For example, Darr et al. (1995) studied vicarious learning in the
pizza industry and modeled learning from own and others’ production experience as
independent, purely additive terms in their theory and empirical specification. Re-
cent research has sought to relax this assumption, examining the conditions under
which experiential and vicarious learning act as substitutes or complements (Baum
and Dahlin, 2007; Schwab, 2007) and the temporal sequencing of experiential and vi-
carious learning (Bingham and Davis, 2012). Building on this research, we argue that
experiential and vicarious learning are interrelated because the process of experiential
learning facilitates vicarious learning.
Our theory rests on the observation that the extent of vicarious learning is a
function not only of the size of the external knowledge pool (Levin and Reiss, 1988;
Spence, 1984) and firms’ ability to absorb external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990) but also of firms’ impetus to acquire that knowledge (Eeckhout and Jovanovic,
2002; Ethiraj and Zhu, 2008; Greve, 2005; Zemsky and Pacheco-de Almeida, 2012).
This impetus is the driver of vicarious learning on which we focus.
Experiential learning is a process that embodies a problem-solution cycle (Arrow,
1962; March and Olsen, 1975). In both theoretical models and empirical research,
this process is often conceptualized as occurring within the locus of a firm, decoupled
from the external knowledge environment. In many formal models – for instance, of
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learning on rugged landscapes (e.g. Levinthal, 1997) and of learning under uncertainty
(Denrell and March, 2001; Posen and Levinthal, 2012) – firms accrue knowledge about
the merits of alternatives based on their own prior experience and use it to solve
subsequent problems. The empirical literature often reflects the same assumption.
For example, Hoopes and Postrel (1999) studied experiential learning in a scientific
software company and observed that “glitches” arose when the firm could not access
internal knowledge to solve problems. Feldman (2000) examined experiential learning
in sta ng activities in a university residence hall and observed that solutions were
found by relying on internal knowledge and not by learning from other universities’
hiring practices.
Yet solutions to problems that arise in the process of experiential learning may
also be found by expropriating knowledge from rivals. External knowledge serves two
ends in facilitating problem solving: identifying the set of alternative solutions that
may solve the problem and evaluating the e cacy of each alternative. In the former,
when a problem is identified in the process of engaging in productive activity, bound-
edly rational firms may face significant di culty in identifying the set of potential
solutions. In many contexts, the set of alternatives that potentially solve a given
problem is very large, and as such, many may be unknown to the firm. For such
problems, external knowledge exposes a firm to a broader set of alternatives and, in
doing so, enhances the e cacy of problem solving.
In the latter, once the set of potential solutions is identified, external knowledge
may enhance the e cacy of evaluating, and selecting among, alternatives. In attempt-
ing to resolve a problem, boundedly rational firms may have only limited experience
with a given alternative, which is problematic when the number of alternatives is large
or when interdependence confounds cause-e↵ect relationships (Levinthal and March,
1993). Moreover, knowledge gleaned from experiential learning tends to be biased
against alternatives that are risky (March, 1996) or have performed poorly in the
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past (Denrell and March, 2001). To the extent that other firms in the industry have
gained knowledge about the merits of di↵erent alternatives, and where that knowl-
edge may be accessed vicariously, the e cacy of selecting a solution from among the
set of possible alternatives may be enhanced by utilizing external knowledge.
As a consequence, problems that arise in the process of experiential learning gen-
erate the impetus to seek external knowledge. In turn, the rate of learning from
experience,  xi , is enhanced by external knowledge, k. We incorporate this in experi-
ential learning by amending the learning model in Equation 2.3, now in log form, as
follows:
c = ↵ +  xi x+  
kk ,
where  xi =  0 +  1k + ⌫i . (2.4)
Here,  0 is the overall mean learning rate,  1 is the contribution of external knowledge
to the rate of experiential learning, i indexes firms, and ⌫i represents firm learning-rate
heterogeneity in the form of a random slope. In addition, the theorizing above suggests
that it is the emergence of problems that trigger a search for solutions external to the
firm. We incorporate problems into our learning model as follows:
c = ↵ +  xi x+  
kk ,
where  xi =  0 +  1k +  2p+  3pk + ⌫i . (2.5)
where p is a problem that arises in the process of engaging in productive activity.
Accordingly, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 1A (H1A): Firms learn more rapidly from experience when
the pool of external knowledge is larger (i.e.,  1 < 0 in Equation 2.4).
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Hypothesis 1B (H1B): Problems increase the extent to which firms uti-
lize external knowledge in the experiential learning process (i.e.,  3 < 0 in
Equation 2.5).
2.2.4 Di↵erences Between Entrants and Incumbents
The theory above posits that firms learn at the intersection of experiential and
vicarious mechanisms. This learning occurs, in part, as a result of firms using external
knowledge to solve problems that arise in the course of experiential learning. In this
section, we argue that the impact of experiential learning as a facilitator of vicarious
learning is relatively small for incumbents but is a significant driver of vicarious
learning for entrants.
To clarify our arguments, consider the extent of (potential) vicarious learning, L,
generated as a firm engages in an additional unit of productive experience, x. We











where P is the occurrence of a problem in the experiential learning process and N is
the amount of external knowledge accessed in solving a problem. Holding constant
the rate at which problems appear from a unit of experience, @P/@x, we discuss two
elements of the righthand side of Equation 2.6 and highlight why we would expect
each to be greater for entrants than incumbents.3
First, @L/@N is the marginal learning from using a unit of external knowledge in the
process of engaging in productive activity. The problem-solving activities underlying
experiential learning tend to be repetitive in nature (Argote, 1999; Denrell et al.,
3Two additional notes are relevant. First, we examine potential learning because, given the
impetus to access a unit of external knowledge, realized learning is a function of potential learning
and the ability to absorb external knowledge. Second, if entrants encounter more problems in the
process of engaging in productive activity, this would tend to further increase the extent to which
they derive value from external knowledge and would lend additional strength to our hypotheses.
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2004). As such, learning by doing that is “associated with repetition of essentially
the same problem is subject to sharply diminishing returns” (Arrow, 1962, p. 155).
While engaging in its early developmental activity, an entrant encounters a myriad of
problems. With each attempt to solve a particular problem, the returns to engaging in
e↵ort to find new and better solutions to subsequent occurrences of the same problem
decline. Thus, while solving problems encountered in experiential learning, entrants
are likely to learn more from external knowledge than incumbents.
Second, @N/@P is the amount of external knowledge used in solving a problem
that arises in the process of engaging in productive activity. The extent to which a
firm seeks outside knowledge, and thus learns vicariously, is a function of the extent
to which it already harbors knowledge that might form the basis of a solution to a
problem. When internal knowledge is insu cient, an organization is more likely to
seek external knowledge to solve problems that emerge in the experiential learning
process (Simon and Lieberman, 2010).
One would expect entrants to harbor less knowledge than incumbents. Although
entrants possess pre-founding knowledge (Agarwal et al., 2004; Helfat and Lieberman,
2002; Huber, 1991), it is only a portion of the knowledge an entrant will eventually
possess as it matures into incumbency. This expectation, in part, reflects the observa-
tion that the prefounding knowledge of a team of limited size is unlikely to encompass
the breadth of knowledge necessary to inform all of the activities of the firm. Ad-
ditionally, prefounding knowledge by definition excludes organizationally embedded
knowledge stored in routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This knowledge is only built
over time through repeated interactions across multiple members of the organization
(Feldman, 2000), as well as through interactions across diverse functional units (Zahra
et al., 2000). For example, Epple et al. (1996) studied learning curves across multiple
production shifts in the same plant. They concluded that knowledge embedded in the
organization, its routines, and its technologies exists over and above that possessed
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by individuals. Therefore, entrants are more likely to draw on external knowledge
when confronted with a problem that emerges in the experiential learning process
because they typically lack stocks of organizationally embedded knowledge.
In sum, the discussion above suggests that the extent of learning at the intersection
of experiential and vicarious processes is greater for entrants than for incumbents. As
such, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 2A (H2A): Entrants’ experiential learning rate increases more
than incumbents’ when the pool of external knowledge is larger (i.e.,  1[en-
trant] <  1[incumbent] in Equation 2.4).
Moreover, because we argued that entrants access more external knowledge in
solving problems that arise during experience (i.e., the @N/@P term), we further hy-
pothesize the following.
Hypothesis 2B (H2B): The extent to which problems induce the utiliza-
tion of external knowledge in the experiential learning process is greater for
entrants than for incumbents (i.e.,  3[entrant] <  3[incumbent] in Equation
2.5).
2.3 Industry
We test our hypotheses in U.S. commercial banking post deregulation. We chose
this industry because it is geographically fragmented with localized competition,
highly regulated, and characterized by substantial firm-level learning. Fragmenta-
tion allows us to compare discrete markets characterized by di↵erent levels of local
external knowledge within the same industry. We define a competitive market as a
state because the unit of observation in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) regulatory system is a state-level insurance certificate.4 Intense regulation
4A certificate is required for each state in which a bank operates and covers all branches of a
bank operating within that state.
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and strict reporting requirements allow us to obtain quarterly cost data for the full
census of banks, including all entrants.
Considerable learning occurs in commercial banking. However, firms do not typ-
ically compete and win on the basis of technological innovation. As a consequence,
experiential learning, as opposed to mechanisms such as R&D, is an important driver
of change in firm performance. To gain a deeper understanding of learning by new
entrants in commercial banking, we interviewed a number of executives at start-up
banks.
A central theme of founders’ comments was the important role of post entry
learning. Cost reduction appears to be the main goal of their learning e↵orts. One
founder identified the need to learn how to e ciently utilize sta↵ and streamline
numerous operational processes. Another founder identified the need to learn how
to maintain a su ciently diversified loan portfolio and to reduce loan default rates.
These comments reflect standard wisdom in banking texts. For example, Saunders
and Cornett (2003) argued that bank performance relies heavily on improvements
in areas such as operational expenses, risk management (e.g., credit, interest rate,
information technology), deposit generation, and regulatory compliance.
On the surface, the need for significant learning after entry seems surprising given
that new banks are typically founded by industry veterans. However, founders of-
ten noted that the knowledge of the founding team is typically limited relative to
the breadth of knowledge required, and established banks possess organizationally
embedded knowledge beyond the reach of individual employees. For example, one
founder, formerly a corporate executive in charge of lending at a major incumbent
bank, detailed his start-up’s highly ine cient loan drafting process. In hindsight,
he realized that the ine ciency was due to di culties in identifying and replicating
complex organizational routines for managing the myriad provisions in modern loans.
In addressing these types of problems, banking executives pointed to the lack of
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internally available solutions and, as such, the need to learn from the knowledge and
experience of other banks. The bankers often discussed their use of interpersonal
relationships to learn from others, which is facilitated by extensive regulation in
banking. For example, one executive examined public regulatory filings to identify
nearby banks that excelled in residential mortgage loans, then identified those banks
at which he had acquaintances that might be willing to share knowledge.
In sum, commercial banking provides uniquely rich data from which to examine
the intersection of experiential and vicarious learning. In the next sections, we discuss
our model, data, and results.
2.4 Empirical Model
Our empirical model consists of two stages. In the first stage, we model an in-
dustry cost frontier to collect measures of e ciency for each firm, both entrants and
incumbents, in each quarter. In the second stage, we model learning by consider-
ing a firm’s e ciency (from the first stage) as a function of its experience and the
knowledge of rivals.
2.4.1 Stage 1: Firm E ciency
We follow convention in the banking literature by modeling cost e ciency as a
stochastic cost frontier using a translog cost function (Berger, 2003; Knott and Posen,
2005; Knott et al., 2009; Mester, 1993). The stochastic frontier model assumes that
the log of firm i’s cost in quarter t, cit, di↵ers from the cost frontier, cmin, by an
amount that reflects its cost ine ciency. In particular, the translog cost function
represents the total cost for firm i in quarter t as a function of a firm’s chosen output
levels and a given set of input prices:
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it + uit + eit , (2.7)
where cit is the log of observed firm cost, y
j
it is a vector of log output levels (j indexes
output elements), whit is a vector of log input prices (h indexes input elements), uit
is log cost e ciency with truncated normal distribution, and eit is the normally dis-
tributed error term. This translog cost function allows us to incorporate a complex
array of bank inputs and outputs and to accommodate trade-o↵s in market strategies
(product mixes and prices) and in operational strategies (input mixes and scale).
We collect estimates of the expected value of firm-quarter cost e ciency in Stage
1, E(uit|eit), which we label as ui,t. ui,t reflects the log of firm i’s costs relative to
a firm on the cost frontier. For brevity, we refer to ui,t as cost, rather than cost
e ciency, because cost e ciency is functionally cost after controlling for di↵erences
in scale and input/output mix. As such, lower values of ui,t correspond to increased
e ciency – i.e., lower cost. The estimate of uit serves as our Stage 2 dependent
variable testing our learning rate mechanisms.
2.4.2 Stage 2: Tests of learning mechanisms
In the second stage, we model learning by examining increases in e ciency, or,
equivalently, reduction in a firm’s cost relative to the firm at the cost frontier. We
transform the log cost variable ui,t with the monotonic function g(ui,t) = ln(eui,t  
1).5 We then model learning, as represented in Equation 2.5, while controlling for
time-varying firm- and market-level attributes, such that:
5We do so because, by construction, eu approaches 1 as experience approaches infinity. However,
the functional form of the learning curve model (Equation 2.1) requires that relative costs asymptote
to 0 (Argote, 1999), which is satisfied by eg(u).
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g(ui,t) =  0 +  
x
i xi,t +  
kki,t +  1Ss,t +  2Fs,t + ↵i + ✏i,t, (2.8)
where  xi is the coe cient of learning from experience,  
k is the coe cient of vicarious
learning unaided by experiential learning, s is the state in which firm i operates, and
✏i,t is the error term. Ss,t and Fs,t represent vectors of state- and firm-level controls.
To study the impact of external knowledge on the rate a firm learns from experi-
ence, we allow the learning coe cient  xi from Equation 2.8 to vary across firms such
that:
 xi =  0 +  1ki,t +  2pi,t +  3pi,tki,t + ⌫i, (2.9)
where the coe cient on the extent to which external knowledge enhances experiential
learning is given by  1, and the coe cient on the extent to which external knowledge
is used to solve problems is given by  3. The inclusion of firm-specific components,
intercepts ↵i (in Equation 2.8) and slopes ⌫i (in Equation 2.9), modeled as random
e↵ects, account for unobserved heterogeneity in both initial costs (or, in the case of
incumbents, costs at the start of the observation window) as well as rates of learn-
ing from experience. We substitute Equation 2.9 into Equation 2.8 and estimate
the resulting random-coe cients model using a maximum-likelihood estimator. The
random coe cients model is a panel regression technique that extends a random ef-
fects model so that not only the intercept but also the coe cients are allowed to
vary per panel. We make the standard assumption that the covariance matrix of the
random parameters ⌫ and ↵, ⌃⌫↵, is bivariate normal, and we impose no additional
constraints.
The coe cients  1 and  3 in Equation 2.9 inform our hypotheses:  1 < 0 would
support the hypothesis that firms learn more rapidly from experience when the pool
of external knowledge is larger (H1A),  3 < 0 would support the hypothesis that prob-
lems increase the extent to which firms utilize external knowledge in the experiential
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learning process (H1B),  1[entrant] <  1[incumbent] would support the hypothesis
that the experiential learning rate of entrants increases more than incumbents’ when
the pool of external knowledge is larger (H2A), and finally,  3[entrant]<  3[incumbent]
would support the hypothesis that entrants benefit more than incumbents from using
external knowledge to solve problems encountered in the experiential learning process
(H2B).
2.5 Data and Measures
The data for the study came from the FDIC Research Database of quarterly
financial data for all commercial banks filing the “Report of Condition and Income”
(call report). The FDIC assigns a unique certificate number to each bank that enters
a given state. A single bank cannot have the same certificate number for branches
that operate in di↵erent states. We have therefore taken the bank (certificate number)
as our basic unit of analysis. We examined all banks in each state plus the District
of Columbia for the period Q1 1984 to Q1 1998. This data set contains over a half
million firm-quarter observations that are used in the first-stage estimation model.
In particular, we observed quarterly data for a comprehensive set of 1,594 entrants
for an average of seven years each and for a comprehensive set of 12,652 incumbents
that operated during this period.
As the Stage 1 model follows the design of Knott and Posen (2005) and Knott et
al. (2009), we omit here a detailed discussion of the cost, input, and output variables
in the translog cost function.
For the Stage 2 model, we constructed a number of explanatory variables. We
constructed a measure of external knowledge, ki,t, using the cost e ciencies calculated
from the Stage 1 model. In particular, we used the average log cost of firms in
state s (other than firm i) and multiplied this value by  1 to represent external
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knowledge available to firm i.6 As such, we examine the productivity implications of
cost as a proxy for knowledge itself. Cost can be viewed as an outcome of employing
knowledge in production, C = f1(K). Thus, knowledge is the functional inverse
such that K = f 11 (C) (Griliches, 1998). This functional relationship reflects a wide
body of literature. It is the principle modeling assumption in the theoretical work in
Spence (1984) and in the empirical work of Levin and Reiss (1988), which employed
Federal Trade Commission data to estimate models in which firms invest in knowledge
expressly to reduce costs. This assumption is also central to Griliches’ (1998) models
of R&D production functions, and Nelson and Winter (1982) assumed that firms
invest to generate knowledge in the form of superior production practices that lower
unit costs.7
Our measure of experiential learning, xi,t, is given by the cumulative number of
quarters in which a bank has competed in the market. Accordingly, we represented
a firm’s experience as xi,t = ln(t + 1) so that at time 0 a firm has no experience.
This temporal operationalization of experience is widely used in the learning curve
literature (Argote et al., 1990; Darr et al., 1995; Lieberman, 1984).8 We defined a
problem, p, as occurring if loan output dropped for two consecutive quarters. This
measure reflects a problem that arises when performance is assessed relative to a
firm’s own past performance.
We defined an entrant as a new commercial banking institution. Banks that
entered within the years 1984 - 1997 are considered entrants in our sample, resulting
6Multiplying by  1 preserves the more natural convention that a larger ki,t represents more
external knowledge.
7Ideally, we would measure external knowledge directly. This is possible in industries where
technical knowledge is codified and embodied in patents. In industries where patents are rare and
nontechnical knowledge dominates (e.g., banking), directly measuring knowledge is problematic. An
alternative to using an outcome of knowledge production (e.g., cost) is to employ an input, !, to
the knowledge production function, K = f2(!). We examine firm experience as ! in our robustness
analysis.
8Data limitations preclude constructing a cumulative output measure of experience for the entire
history of all incumbent firms because our data extend back only eight years prior to the start of
the sample window.
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in an entrant subsample of 1,594 banks and 42,207 firm-quarter observations. To
provide a sharp delineation between entrants and incumbents, we defined incumbents
as those firms founded prior to 1975 (i.e., at least 10 years prior to the earliest
entrants). This results in an incumbent subsample of 10,711 banks and 490,958
firm-quarter observations.
A number of control variables are included in the model. To control for branch
scale e↵ects not already accounted for in the first-stage estimation, we included two
variables: (a) branch count, the number of branches operated by the bank; and (b)
branch scale, the average size of a branch measured in terms of total output in thou-
sands of constant 1996 dollars. We controlled for corporate structure by including
(c) a holding company indicator variable, as well as a number of measures of the
size of the holding company; (d) hc certificates, the number of additional banks (cer-
tificates) held by the holding company; (e) hc branches, the number of additional
branches in the bank holding company system beyond the number of branches in the
observation certificate; and (f) hc states, the number of additional states in which the
holding company operates banks. We controlled for economic di↵erences across mar-
kets by including variables representing quarterly data on demand: (g) population,
(h) housing start permits, and competition with (i) a Herfindahl index of industry
concentration, HHI.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Stage 1: Firm E ciency
Detailed results from our Stage 1 frontier estimation are available upon request.
Here, we wish to highlight important descriptive characteristics of firm costs (i.e.,
eui,t). The mean cost (of all firms) over the sample period is 17.2% above that of a
firm on the cost frontier. With regard to entrants, in Figure 2.1, we plot mean and
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Figure 2.1: Descriptive Data on Entrant Cost by Age (Relative to Incumbents)
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Table 5 Marginal Effect on Vicarious Learning from a
Unit Change in External Knowledge
Marginal benefit of vicarious learning
Unaided by Facilitated by Faciltated by exp.
experience experience Total as share of total
Entrant É1066 É1020 É2086 0.42
Incumbent É3070 É0057 É4027 0.13











) based on Model 2
in Table 4. Following our model and results, we
decomposed this marginal effect into that unaided by
experience (i.e., the k
i1 t
term in Equation (8)) and that
absorbed in the process of experiential learning (i.e., the
k
i1 t
term in Equation (9)). We see that the marginal effect
of vicarious learning unaided by experience is 122%
larger (i.e., the inverse of the 0.45 entrant-to-incumbent
ratio in the table) in magnitude for incumbents than
for entrants (É3070 versus É1066). This result conforms
to the conventional wisdom that entrants are likely to
benefit less from vicarious learning because, relative to
incumbents, they lack prior related knowledge. Con-
versely, the marginal benefit of vicarious learning that
arises in the process of experiential learning is 110%
larger for entrants than for incumbents (É1020 versus
É0057). In total, the contribution of external knowledge
for incumbents is 49% larger than for entrants (É4027
versus É2086). Finally, we find that for entrants, 42%
of the benefit they achieved from external knowledge
came as a by-product of the experiential learning pro-
cess, compared to 13% of the benefit for incumbents.
In Table 4, Model 3, we examined the effects of
problems on cost efficiency. The coefficient estimate on
p
i1 t
is significant at 0.0817 for entrants and 0.0181 for
incumbents. Hypothesis 2B is tested in Table 4, Model 4,





, in the experiential learning model. The




is É00221 for entrants
and É00093 for incumbents. Both are significant, and
a Wald test indicates the difference between the two
is also significant. The net contribution of a prob-
lem to experiential learning rates, at the mean level of
external knowledge, is É00098 for entrants and É00053
for incumbents. Thus, the contribution of problems to
accessing external knowledge in the experiential learn-
ing process is twice as large for entrants than for incum-
bents. This supports Hypothesis 2B, that entrants benefit
more than incumbents from using external knowledge to
solve problems encountered in the experiential learning
process.
To illustrate the role of external knowledge in the
experiential learning process, in Figure 2 we plot-
ted entrant learning curves across knowledge contexts.
Figure 2 Predicted Entrant Learning Curves in Different
Knowledge Contexts
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We used the estimates in Table 4, Model 4 to generate
predicted median costs for entrants relative to incum-
bents. We focused on the impact of being in a state in
the top or bottom 10th percentile of external knowledge.
The graph highlights the observation that a 10-quarter-
old entrant firm in a state in the 90th percentile for
knowledge is developmentally equivalent to 15-quarter-
old firm in a 10th percentile state.
Robustness Analysis. We conducted extensive sensi-
tivity analyses to rule out two broad sets of concerns,
the first reflecting alternative measures and estimation
techniques and the second reflecting alternative explana-
tions. A brief overview of the sensitivity analyses fol-
lows, with a detailed explication of the results provided
in the online appendix. Our results are robust to each of
these sensitivity tests.
In one set of analyses, we tested the sensitivity of
our results to alternative measures and estimation tech-
niques: (1) To address the possibility that the error terms
in the entrant and incumbent models of our study contain
common shocks that bias the estimates, we constructed
a model that jointly estimates entrant and incumbent
learning. (2) Firm output is often used in the organiza-
tional learning literature as a proxy for organizational
knowledge (Darr et al. 1995, Ingram and Simons 2002).
Accordingly, we examined a model that uses cumulative
loan output (rather than cost) to construct a measure of
external knowledge and a model that uses cumulative
loan output (rather than time) to construct a measure of
own experience. (3) Our definition of a problem reflects
a firm’s own past performance, but prior research has
also defined problems relative to others’ performance
(Greve 1998). Hence, we examined a market share-based
definition of a problem, which reflects not only own-

































































































































median entrant cost across entrant age (relative to incumbents). Entrants are initially
much less e cient than incumbents. In the first y ar after ntry (i.e., the average
of the first four quarters i Figure 2.1), mean ntrant cost s 57% higher than that
of incumbents. But entrants rapidly become competitive, with cost only 4% higher
tha i cumbents in the third year post entry.
To pr vide a better sense of incumbent learning versus entrant learning, as given by
increased  ciency (i.e., a decrease in cost), we follow longitudinal microdata studies
and compu e a transition matrix of firm e ciency (see Table 2.1). The transition
m trix relat s a firm’s e ciency in one quarter (a row in Table 2.1) to its e ciency
i the next quarter (a column in Table 2.1). Table 2.1 is broken up by quintiles.
As a example, the row labeled 3 in Table 2.1 indicates that 21.33% of firms in the
third-most e cient quintile of all firms ascend to the second-most e cient quintile
in the next quarter. Table 2.1 also shows the relative e ciency of firms at entry
(“Entry” row) and at exit, either through ergers or failure (“Exit” column).
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Table 2.1: Transition Tables of Incumbents and Entrants Within Three Years of Entry
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frontier. With regard to entrants, in Figure 1, we plot
mean and median entrant cost across entrant age (rela-
tive to incumbents). Entrants are initially much less effi-
cient than incumbents. In the first year after entry (i.e.,
the average of the first four quarters in Figure 1), mean
entrant cost is 57% higher than that of incumbents. But
entrants rapidly become competitive, with cost only 4%
higher than incumbents in the third year post entry.
To provide a better sense of incumbent learning versus
entrant learning, as given by increased efficiency (i.e., a
decrease in cost), we follow longitudinal microdata stud-
ies and compute a transition matrix of firm efficiency
(see Table 1). The transition matrix relates a firm’s effi-
ciency in one quarter (a row in Table 1) to its efficiency
in the next quarter (a column in Table 1). Table 1 is bro-
ken up by quintiles. As an example, the row labeled 3 in
Table 1 indicates that 21.33% of firms in the third-most
efficient quintile of all firms ascend to the second-most
efficient quintile in the next quarter. Table 1 also shows
the relative efficiency of firms at entry (“Entry” row)
Table 1 Transition Tables of Incumbents and Entrants Within
Three Years of Entry
Low cost High cost
1 2 3 4 5 Exit
Entry 2.33 1.89 2.46 0.00
1 79.68 16.26 2.35 0.73
2 17.68 58.04 19.66 0.80
3 2.19 21.33 54.29 0.94
4 0.55 3.16 20.83 1.22


































and at exit, either through mergers or failure (“Exit”
column).
Table 1 highlights three notable patterns. First, rela-
tive firm efficiencies are fairly stable, as indicated in the
high percentage of firms remaining in the same quintile
(the boxed entries). Second, firms with lower relative
efficiency (i.e., in a higher quintile) are more likely to
exit, as expected. Third, firms typically have low relative
efficiency at entry, with 87.7% in the lowest quintile in
the first quarter post entry.
Stage 2: Tests of Learning Mechanisms
Using the log of firm costs, u
i1 t
, from our Stage 1 model,
we tested the learning rate hypotheses. Summary statis-
tics for the data employed in these tests are presented in
Table 2.
Table 3 presents the results, split in two horizontal
parts. Panel B represents the cost model of Equation (8).
Panel A represents the experiential learning model of
Equation (9). These equations are jointly estimated.
Before turning to the hypothesized effects, we will
focus attention on three baseline models (Table 3, Mod-
els 1–3). Model 1 (panel B) isolates the control variables.
Bank size effects (branch_scale and branch_count) are
negative and significant, indicating that larger banks
learn faster. Though high correlations preclude interpret-
ing corporate effects individually (i.e., holding_company,
hc_certificates, hc_branches, hc_states), the net effect
of holding-company variables is reduced cost, which is
consistent with learning from corporate parents (because
we control for scale). Market structure, measured by
the Herfindahl index (HHI), is negative and significant,
implying that higher market power (lower competition)
enables higher revenue per unit cost. Market size effects
(population and permits) are highly correlated. We con-
sidered the net effects of population and housing starts
in Model 1 and find that costs generally decrease with
demand, consistent with the explanation that firms learn
from the increased output.
We examined experiential learning in Table 3,
Model 2 (panel A) with the inclusion of cumulative
experience. The negative and significant coefficient on
the experience term (the constant term in panel A) sup-
ports the learning curve expectation that costs decrease
with experience.
We also estimated two firm-level random effects: ç,
which reflects a firm-specific rate of learning from expe-
rience, and Å, which reflects a firm-specific cost inter-
cept. For each, we estimated the standard deviation,
which is significant at the p < 00001 level. We also
estimated ê
çÅ
, the correlation between ç and Å, which
is positive and significant, reflecting the intuition that
efficient firms proceed more rapidly along their learn-
ing curves. We examined vicarious learning (unaided by
experiential learning) in Table 3, Model 3 (panel B),
































































































































Table 2.1 highlights three notable patterns. First, relative firm e ciencies are
fairly stable, as indicated in the high percentage of firms remaining in the same
quintile (the boxed entries). Second, firms with lower relative e ciency (i.e., in a
higher quintile) are more likely to exit, as expected. Third, firms typically have low
relative e ciency at entry, with 87.7% in the lowest quintile in the first quarter post
entry.
2.6.2 Stage 2: Tests of Learning Mechanisms
Using the log of firm costs, ui,t , from our Stage 1 model, we tested the learning rate
hypotheses. Summary statistics for the data employed in these tests are presented in
Table 2.2.
Table 2.3 presents the results, split in two horizontal parts. Panel B represents
the cost model of Equation 2.8. Panel A represents the experiential learning model
of Equation 2.9. These equations are jointly estimated.
Before turning to the hypothesized e↵ects, we will focus attention on three base-
line models (Table 2.3, Models 1-3). Model 1 (panel B) isolates the control variables.
Bank size e↵ects (branch scale and branch count) are negative and significant, indi-
cating that larger banks learn faster. Though high correlations preclude interpret-
ing corporate e↵ects individually (i.e., holding company, hc certificates, hc branches,
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hc states), the net e↵ect of holding-company variables is reduced cost, which is con-
sistent with learning from corporate parents (because we control for scale). Market
structure, measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI), is negative and significant, im-
plying that higher market power (lower competition) enables higher revenue per unit
cost. Market size e↵ects (population and permits) are highly correlated. We consid-
ered the net e↵ects of population and housing starts in Model 1 and find that costs
generally decrease with demand, consistent with the explanation that firms learn from
the increased output.
We examined experiential learning in Table 2.3, Model 2 (panel A) with the in-
clusion of cumulative experience. The negative and significant coe cient on the ex-
perience term (the constant term in panel A) supports the learning curve expectation
that costs decrease with experience.
We also estimated two firm-level random e↵ects: ⌫, which reflects a firm-specific
rate of learning from experience, and ↵, which reflects a firm-specific cost intercept.
For each, we estimated the standard deviation, which is significant at the p < 0.001
level. We also estimated ⇢⌫↵, the correlation between ⌫ and ↵, which is positive and
significant, reflecting the intuition that e cient firms proceed more rapidly along their
learning curves. We examined vicarious learning (unaided by experiential learning)
in Table 2.3, Model 3 (panel B), with the inclusion of external knowledge. The
coe cient on ki,t is negative and significant, indicating that costs are lower in more
knowledge-abundant contexts.9
9In Model 3, which includes an external knowledge term in the vicarious learning model (i.e.,
Table 2.3, panel B), HHI turns positive. As seen later in the models separating entrants from
incumbents (Table 2.4), this change is driven by the entrant subsample and is consistent with the
possibility that entrants require time to adjust their practices to respond to more- intense competition
(Knott and Posen, 2005).
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Table 2.2: Stage 2 Data Summary
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Table 2 Stage 2 Data Summary
Panel Aa
Mean SD Min Max
(1) u
i1 t
00159 00153 00008 40591
(2) g4u
i1 t
5 É10958 00639 É40884 40581
(3) entrant 00079 00270 00000 10000
(4) x
i1 t
50326 00995 00000 60763
(5) k
i1 t
É00162 00056 É00765 É00076
(6) p
i1 t
00178 00382 00000 10000
(7) HHI 00059 00058 00006 00825
(8) branch_count 50843 270285 10000 212150000
(9) branch_scale 360760 2100393 00029 1714720773
(10) holding_company 00304 00460 00000 10000
(11) hc_certificates 30507 100269 00000 870000
(12) hc_branches 330930 1400092 00000 312440000
(13) hc_states 00333 10342 00000 150000
(14) population 611600359 510990057 4530690 3219870676
(15) permits 3116810281 3519790476 00000 3.15e+05
Panel B







(3) entrant 0016 0014 1000
(4) x
i1 t
É0027 É0026 É0081 1000
(5) k
i1 t
É0033 É0043 É0020 0028 1000
(6) p
i1 t
0007 0010 É0006 0005 É0002 1000
(7) HHI 0012 0014 0019 É0017 É0037 É0004 1000
(8) branch_count É0000 É0000 É0003 0006 É0009 É0000 0016 1000
(9) branch_scale 0001 0001 É0001 0002 É0003 0000 0003 0001 1000
(10) holding_company 0001 0003 É0003 0003 0001 0002 É0002 0014 0005 1000
(11) hc_certificates 0006 0008 É0004 0003 É0004 0003 É0005 0006 0003 0052 1000
(12) hc_branches 0004 0006 É0002 0003 É0007 0004 0007 0023 0004 0037 0063 1000
(13) hc_states 0005 0006 É0001 0004 É0004 0004 0007 0022 0005 0038 0071 0079 1000
(14) population 0012 0014 0017 É0016 É0032 É0004 0033 0012 0006 0000 É0002 0004 É0001 1000





is negative and significant, indicating that costs
are lower in more knowledge-abundant contexts.8
Tests of the Intersection of Experiential and Vicarious
Learning. Hypothesis 1 is tested in Table 3, Model 4
(panel A), with the inclusion of external knowledge k
i1 t
in the experiential learning model. The coefficient esti-
mate is É0037. It is significant at the p < 00001 level.
For brevity, in the remainder of the analysis, statisti-
cal significance is at the p < 00001 level unless other-
wise noted. This negative coefficient estimate supports
the contention of Hypothesis 1A that firms learn more
rapidly from experience when the pool of external
knowledge is larger.
The test of Hypothesis 1B is given in Table 3, Mod-
els 5 and 6 (panel A), which includes problems, p
i1 t
,





in the experiential learning model. Here, p
i1 t
is defined
as two consecutive declining quarters of loan output
(we test other definitions of p
i1 t
in the robustness anal-
ysis). The coefficient on p
i1 t
is positive and significant
in Model 5. This implies, erroneously, that a problem
decreases the rate of experiential learning. Of course,
our theory suggests a model of experiential learning that
does not account for the interaction of problems and
external knowledge is misspecified, because it seems
unlikely that firms engage in experiential learning with-
out drawing on external knowledge to solve problems.





É0.114 and significant, whereas the coefficient on p
i1 t
is
now nonsignificant. At the mean level of external knowl-
edge, the net contribution of a problem to experiential
learning is significant at É0.0676. This supports Hypoth-
esis 1B, that problems increase the extent to which firms
utilize external knowledge in experiential learning.
Tests of Entrant vs. Incumbent Learning. Hypothe-
sis 2 is tested in Table 4. We split the data into entrant
and incumbent subsamples to examine the possibility
that entrants possess a distinct advantage in employing

































































































































2.6.2.1 Tests of the Intersection of Experiential and Vicarious Le rning
Hypothesis 1 is t sted in Table 2.3, Model 4 (panel A), with the inclusion of
external knowledge ki,t in the experi ntial learning model. The coe cient estimate
is  0.37. It is significant at the p < 0.001 level. For brevity, in the remainder of
the analysis, statistical signific nce is at the p < 0.001 level unless otherwise noted.
This negative coe cient estimate supports the contention of Hypothesis 1A that firms
learn more rapidly from experi nce when the pool of external k owledge is lar er.
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Table 2.3: Experience and Problems as Facilitators of Vicarious Learning
!!!!!!!Model!1!!! !!!!!!!Model!2!!! !!!!!!!Model!3!!! !!!!!!!Model!4!!! !!!!!!!Model!5!!! !!!!!!!Model!6!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !-3.679e-01*** !-3.555e-01*** !-3.363e-01***





!!3.338e+00*** !!3.214e+00*** !!3.215e+00*** !!3.188e+00*** !!3.186e+00***
(2.702e-02)!!! (2.556e-02)!!! (2.553e-02)!!! (2.524e-02)!!! (2.522e-02)!!!
Constant term !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !-4.183e-01*** !-2.627e-01*** !-3.056e-01*** !-3.410e-01*** !-3.398e-01***
(i.e.!estimate!of!δ0) !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (3.221e-02)!!! (3.103e-02)!!! (3.111e-02)!!! (3.085e-02)!!! (3.084e-02)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !-4.159e+00*** !-2.244e+00*** !-2.244e+00*** !-2.233e+00***
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (1.867e-02)!!! (9.628e-02)!!! (9.550e-02)!!! (9.543e-02)!!!
!-4.488e-01*** !-1.518e-01*** !!1.916e-01*** !!1.942e-01*** !!1.839e-01*** !!1.805e-01***
(1.979e-02)!!! (2.190e-02)!!! (2.101e-02)!!! (2.100e-02)!!! (2.084e-02)!!! (2.082e-02)!!!
!-8.846e-04*** !-7.581e-04*** !-7.143e-04*** !-7.027e-04*** !-6.722e-04*** !-6.721e-04***
(4.242e-05)!!! (4.481e-05)!!! (4.292e-05)!!! (4.291e-05)!!! (4.258e-05)!!! (4.254e-05)!!!
!-2.650e-04*** !-2.575e-04*** !-2.530e-04*** !-2.530e-04*** !-2.488e-04*** !-2.479e-04***
(6.043e-06)!!! (6.142e-06)!!! (5.885e-06)!!! (5.883e-06)!!! (5.837e-06)!!! (5.833e-06)!!!
!-6.677e-02*** !-1.178e-02*** !-2.216e-04!!! !-7.305e-04!!! !-2.699e-03!!! !-2.974e-03!!!
(2.333e-03)!!! (2.535e-03)!!! (2.426e-03)!!! (2.426e-03)!!! (2.406e-03)!!! (2.405e-03)!!!
!!2.254e-03*** !!7.038e-04*** !!1.849e-04!!! !!2.009e-04!!! !!1.528e-04!!! !!1.641e-04!!!
(1.443e-04)!!! (1.525e-04)!!! (1.460e-04)!!! (1.460e-04)!!! (1.448e-04)!!! (1.447e-04)!!!
!!3.016e-05**! !!1.157e-04*** !!1.239e-04*** !!1.258e-04*** !!1.073e-04*** !!1.061e-04***
(9.899e-06)!!! (1.055e-05)!!! (1.010e-05)!!! (1.009e-05)!!! (1.002e-05)!!! (1.001e-05)!!!
!-7.911e-03*** !-6.543e-03*** !!1.298e-03!!! !!1.169e-03!!! !!1.324e-03!!! !!1.565e-03!!!
(1.168e-03)!!! (1.272e-03)!!! (1.218e-03)!!! (1.218e-03)!!! (1.208e-03)!!! (1.207e-03)!!!
!-1.576e-05*** !!7.140e-06*** !!3.048e-05*** !!2.999e-05*** !!3.065e-05*** !!3.007e-05***
(8.498e-07)!!! (1.806e-06)!!! (1.752e-06)!!! (1.755e-06)!!! (1.743e-06)!!! (1.741e-06)!!!
!!4.128e-08!!! !-1.310e-06*** !-7.794e-07*** !-7.951e-07*** !-6.673e-07*** !-6.070e-07***
(3.921e-08)!!! (5.125e-08)!!! (4.910e-08)!!! (4.909e-08)!!! (4.872e-08)!!! (4.873e-08)!!!
!!3.819e-01*** !!1.919e+01*** !!1.850e+01*** !!1.850e+01*** !!1.835e+01*** !!1.835e+01***
(3.754e-04)!!! (1.568e-01)!!! (1.484e-01)!!! (1.483e-01)!!! (1.466e-01)!!! (1.465e-01)!!!
!!4.017e-02*** !!4.082e-02*** !!4.092e-02*** !!4.104e-02*** !!4.099e-02***
(4.153e-04)!!! (4.228e-04)!!! (4.239e-04)!!! (4.246e-04)!!! (4.239e-04)!!!
!-1.739e+00*** !!3.271e-01+!! !-1.463e+00*** !-1.248e+00*** !-1.062e+00*** !-1.049e+00***
(7.618e-03)!!! (1.841e-01)!!! (1.776e-01)!!! (1.779e-01)!!! (1.765e-01)!!! (1.765e-01)!!!
Log-likelihood !!-271799.6!!! !!-201157.2!!! !!-177435.3!!! !!-177232.9!!! !!-172945.1!!! !!!!-172526!!!













pi,t (problem)     





ki,t (external knowledge)                
σν
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The test of Hypothesis 1B is given in Table 2.3, Models 5 and 6 (panel A), which
includes problems, pi,t, and their interaction with external knowledge, pi,tki,t, in the
experiential learning model. Here, pi,t is defined as two consecutive declining quarters
of loan output (we test other definitions of pi,t in the robustness analysis). The
coe cient on pi,t is positive and significant in Model 5. This implies, erroneously, that
a problem decreases the rate of experiential learning. Of course, our theory suggests
a model of experiential learning that does not account for the interaction of problems
and external knowledge is mis-specified, as it seems unlikely that firms engage in
experiential learning without drawing on external knowledge to solve problems.
In Model 6, the coe cient estimate on pi,tki,t is  0.114 and significant, while the
coe cient on pi,t is now non-significant. At the mean level of external knowledge,
the net contribution of a problem to experiential learning is significant at  0.0676.
This supports Hypothesis 1B, that problems increase the extent to which firms utilize
external knowledge in experiential learning.
2.6.2.2 Tests of Entrant vs. Incumbent Learning
Hypothesis 2 is tested in Table 2.4. We split the data into entrant and incum-
bent subsamples to examine the possibility that entrants possess a distinct advantage
in employing external knowledge to solve problems that emerge in the experiential
learning process.10
10We used a split entrant/incumbent sample to facilitate explication of the results. In additional
robustness analysis, we estimate the Hypothesis 2 tests using the full sample with an entrant dummy
interaction. Results are robust.
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Table 2.4: Entrant and Incumbent Learning
!!!!!!!!(1e)!!! !!!!!!!!(2e)!!! !!!!!!!!(3e)!!! !!!!!!!!(4e)!!! !!!!!!!!(1i)!!! !!!!!!!!(2i)!!! !!!!!!!!(3i)!!! !!!!!!!!(4i)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !*4.611e*01*** !*4.506e*01*** !*4.004e*01*** !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !*1.024e*01*** !*9.869e*02*** !*9.023e*02**!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (9.819e*02)!!! (9.737e*02)!!! (9.769e*02)!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2.963e*02)!!! (2.935e*02)!!! (2.934e*02)!!!
!!8.173e*02*** !!3.502e*02*** !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!1.811e*02*** !!3.353e*03***
(2.806e*03)!!! (8.218e*03)!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (1.898e*04)!!! (6.129e*04)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !*2.208e*01*** !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !*9.345e*02***
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (3.652e*02)!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (3.690e*03)!!!
!!5.118e*01*** !!5.098e*01*** !!5.054e*01*** !!5.058e*01*** !!3.592e+00*** !!3.592e+00*** !!3.559e+00*** !!3.557e+00***
(1.133e*02)!!! (1.128e*02)!!! (1.118e*02)!!! (1.118e*02)!!! (2.971e*02)!!! (2.971e*02)!!! (2.933e*02)!!! (2.930e*02)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Constant term !*5.394e*01*** !*6.295e*01*** !*6.416e*01*** !*6.316e*01*** !!2.848e*02!!! !!1.560e*02!!! !*2.596e*02!!! !*2.672e*02!!!
(i.e.!estimate!of!δ0) (1.372e*02)!!! (2.347e*02)!!! (2.328e*02)!!! (2.333e*02)!!! (3.674e*02)!!! (3.693e*02)!!! (3.659e*02)!!! (3.657e*02)!!!
!*2.979e+00*** !*1.659e+00*** !*1.575e+00*** !*1.622e+00*** !*4.261e+00*** !*3.699e+00*** !*3.654e+00*** !*3.604e+00***
(8.663e*02)!!! (2.933e*01)!!! (2.910e*01)!!! (2.910e*01)!!! (1.827e*02)!!! (1.637e*01)!!! (1.622e*01)!!! (1.621e*01)!!!
!!1.624e+00*** !!1.661e+00*** !!1.645e+00*** !!1.640e+00*** !*1.912e*01*** !*1.910e*01*** !*2.022e*01*** !*2.050e*01***
(7.496e*02)!!! (7.530e*02)!!! (7.459e*02)!!! (7.456e*02)!!! (2.156e*02)!!! (2.156e*02)!!! (2.136e*02)!!! (2.135e*02)!!!
!!4.978e*04+!! !!5.243e*04+!! !!5.900e*04*!! !!5.752e*04*!! !*6.793e*04*** !*6.770e*04*** !*6.467e*04*** !*6.465e*04***
(2.894e*04)!!! (2.897e*04)!!! (2.869e*04)!!! (2.867e*04)!!! (4.084e*05)!!! (4.084e*05)!!! (4.047e*05)!!! (4.045e*05)!!!
!*2.779e*03*** !*2.784e*03*** !*2.678e*03*** !*2.678e*03*** !*2.311e*04*** !*2.310e*04*** !*2.271e*04*** !*2.264e*04***
(1.053e*04)!!! (1.054e*04)!!! (1.047e*04)!!! (1.046e*04)!!! (5.452e*06)!!! (5.452e*06)!!! (5.403e*06)!!! (5.400e*06)!!!
!!6.612e*02*** !!6.774e*02*** !!6.862e*02*** !!6.837e*02*** !*8.189e*03*** !*8.224e*03*** !*1.021e*02*** !*1.045e*02***
(1.629e*02)!!! (1.630e*02)!!! (1.615e*02)!!! (1.614e*02)!!! (2.308e*03)!!! (2.308e*03)!!! (2.287e*03)!!! (2.285e*03)!!!
!!2.928e*03**! !!3.013e*03**! !!3.131e*03**! !!3.229e*03**! !!1.705e*04!!! !!1.709e*04!!! !!1.281e*04!!! !!1.337e*04!!!
(1.135e*03)!!! (1.136e*03)!!! (1.125e*03)!!! (1.125e*03)!!! (1.383e*04)!!! (1.383e*04)!!! (1.371e*04)!!! (1.370e*04)!!!
!!1.958e*04**! !!2.009e*04*** !!1.447e*04*!! !!1.427e*04*!! !!1.398e*04*** !!1.400e*04*** !!1.222e*04*** !!1.214e*04***
(5.979e*05)!!! (5.982e*05)!!! (5.926e*05)!!! (5.924e*05)!!! (9.698e*06)!!! (9.698e*06)!!! (9.612e*06)!!! (9.605e*06)!!!
!!2.885e*02*** !!2.820e*02*** !!2.907e*02*** !!2.863e*02*** !*2.145e*03+!! !*2.157e*03+!! !*2.039e*03+!! !*1.816e*03!!!
(7.435e*03)!!! (7.439e*03)!!! (7.367e*03)!!! (7.364e*03)!!! (1.170e*03)!!! (1.170e*03)!!! (1.160e*03)!!! (1.159e*03)!!!
!!5.164e*05*** !!5.388e*05*** !!5.304e*05*** !!5.253e*05*** !*1.704e*05*** !*1.723e*05*** !*1.679e*05*** !*1.721e*05***
(2.695e*06)!!! (2.739e*06)!!! (2.727e*06)!!! (2.726e*06)!!! (1.771e*06)!!! (1.772e*06)!!! (1.756e*06)!!! (1.753e*06)!!!
!*2.842e*06*** !*2.716e*06*** !*2.428e*06*** !*2.370e*06*** !*1.718e*07**! !*1.703e*07**! !*3.302e*08!!! !!1.836e*08!!!
(1.435e*07)!!! (1.461e*07)!!! (1.451e*07)!!! (1.453e*07)!!! (5.260e*08)!!! (5.260e*08)!!! (5.214e*08)!!! (5.215e*08)!!!
!!1.157e+00*** !!1.154e+00*** !!1.151e+00*** !!1.151e+00*** !!2.076e+01*** !!2.076e+01*** !!2.057e+01*** !!2.056e+01***
(2.274e*02)!!! (2.266e*02)!!! (2.256e*02)!!! (2.256e*02)!!! (1.728e*01)!!! (1.728e*01)!!! (1.706e*01)!!! (1.704e*01)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!3.533e*01*** !!3.604e*01*** !!3.608e*01*** !!3.603e*01*** !!3.012e*02*** !!3.013e*02*** !!3.013e*02*** !!3.009e*02***
(1.074e*02)!!! (1.109e*02)!!! (1.109e*02)!!! (1.107e*02)!!! (3.220e*04)!!! (3.222e*04)!!! (3.214e*04)!!! (3.209e*04)!!!
!*1.499e+00*** !*1.271e+00*** !*1.254e+00*** !*1.262e+00*** !*2.638e+00*** !*2.567e+00*** !*2.344e+00*** !*2.324e+00***
(3.936e*02)!!! (6.327e*02)!!! (6.289e*02)!!! (6.288e*02)!!! (2.112e*01)!!! (2.121e*01)!!! (2.103e*01)!!! (2.101e*01)!!!
Log*likelihood !!*35045.18!!! !!*35035.79!!! !!*34620.92!!! !!*34605.04!!! !!*117363.6!!! !!*117360.2!!! !!*112856.8!!! !!*112540.9!!!
Observations !!!!!!42207!!! !!!!!!42207!!! !!!!!!42207!!! !!!!!!42207!!! !!!!!490958!!! !!!!!490958!!! !!!!!490958!!! !!!!!490958!!!
+!p<0.10,!*!p<0.05,!**!p<0.01,!***!p<0.001
Entrant!Models Incumbent!Models
ki,t (external knowledge)                
pi,t (problem)     

















The model numbers in Table 2.3 are appended with an “e” (entrant) and an “i”
(incumbent). For ease of exposition, we drop the e and i when we refer to both
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subsamples.
In Table 2.3, Model 1, we examined the e↵ects of external knowledge on cost e -
ciency (in panel B), which accounts for vicarious learning unaided by experience. The
coe cient on this external knowledge is 2.98 for entrants and 4.26 for incumbents.
The two coe cients and their di↵erence are significant. As such, in learning from ex-
ternal knowledge, incumbents learn more than entrants when unaided by experiential
learning.
Hypothesis 2A is tested in Table 2.3, Model 2 (panel A), with the inclusion of
external knowledge ki,t in the experiential learning model. This coe cient is  0.461
for entrants, which is larger (i.e., more negative) than the corresponding coe cient of
 0.102 for incumbents. A Wald test indicates the di↵erence between the two is sig-
nificant, supporting Hypothesis 2A that entrants’ experiential learning rate increases
more than incumbents’ when the pool of external knowledge is larger.
To provide a sense of the magnitude of the contribution of external knowledge
to entrants versus incumbents, in Table 2.5 we report the marginal e↵ect, Mi,t, on
vicarious learning of a unit change in external knowledge ki,t (i.e., @g(ui,t)/@ki,t) based on
Model 2 in Table 2.4. Following our model and results, we decomposed this marginal
e↵ect into that unaided by experience (i.e., the ki,t term in Equation 2.8) and that
absorbed in the process of experiential learning (i.e., the ki,t term in Equation 2.9). We
see that the marginal e↵ect of vicarious learning unaided by experience is 122% larger
(i.e., the inverse of the 0.45 entrant-to-incumbent ratio in the table) in magnitude for
incumbents than for entrants ( 3.70 versus  1.66). This result conforms to the
conventional wisdom that entrants are likely to benefit less from vicarious learning
because, relative to incumbents, they lack prior related knowledge. Conversely, the
marginal benefit of vicarious learning that arises in the process of experiential learning
is 110% larger for entrants than for incumbents ( 1.20 versus  0.57). In total, the
contribution of external knowledge for incumbents is 49% larger than for entrants
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( 4.27 versus  2.86). Finally, we find that for entrants, 42% of the benefit they
achieved from external knowledge came as a by-product of the experiential learning
process, compared to 13% of the benefit for incumbents.
Table 2.5: Marginal E↵ect on Vicarious Learning from a Unit Change in External
Knowledge
Posen and Chen: An Advantage of Newness: Vicarious Learning Despite Limited Absorptive Capacity
12 Organization Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–16, © 2013 INFORMS
Table 5 Marginal Effect on Vicarious Learning from a
Unit Change in External Knowledge
Marginal benefit of vicarious learning
Unaided by Facilitated by Faciltated by exp.
experience experience Total as share of total
Entrant É1066 É1020 É2086 0.42
Incumbent É3070 É0057 É4027 0.13
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in Table 4. Following our model and results, we
decomposed this marginal effect into that unaided by
experience (i.e., the k
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term in Equation (8)) and that
absorbed in the process of experiential learning (i.e., the
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term in Equation (9)). We see that the marginal effect
of vicarious learning unaided by experience is 122%
larger (i.e., the inverse of the 0.45 entrant-to-incumbent
ratio in the table) in magnitude for incumbents than
for entrants (É3070 versus É1066). This result conforms
to the conventional wisdom that entrants are likely to
benefit less from vicarious learning because, relative to
incumbents, they lack prior related knowledge. Con-
versely, the marginal benefit of vicarious learning that
arises in the process of experiential learning is 110%
larger for entrants than for incumbents (É1020 versus
É0057). In total, the contribution of external knowledge
for incumbents is 49% larger than for entrants (É4027
versus É2086). Finally, we find that for entrants, 42%
of the benefit they achieved from external knowledge
came as a by-product of the experiential learning pro-
cess, compared to 13% of the benefit for incumbents.
In Table 4, Model 3, we examined the effects of
problems on cost efficiency. The coefficient estimate on
p
i1 t
is significant at 0.0817 for entrants and 0.0181 for
incumbents. Hypothesis 2B is tested in Table 4, Model 4,
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is É00221 for entrants
and É00093 for incumbents. Both are significant, and
a Wald test indicates the difference between the two
is also significant. The net contribution of a prob-
lem to experiential learning rates, at the mean level of
external knowledge, is É00098 for entrants and É00053
for incumbents. Thus, the contribution of problems to
accessing external knowledge in the experiential learn-
ing process is twice as large for entrants than for incum-
bents. This supports Hypothesis 2B, that entrants benefit
more than incumbents from using external knowledge to
solve problems encountered in the experiential learning
process.
To illustrate the role of external knowledge in the
experiential learning process, in Figure 2 we plot-
ted entrant learning curves across knowledge contexts.
Figure 2 Predicted Entrant Learning Curves in Different
Knowledge Contexts
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We used the estimates in Table 4, Model 4 to generate
predicted median costs for entrants relative to incum-
bents. We focused on the impact of being in a state in
the top or bottom 10th percentile of external knowledge.
The graph highlights the observation that a 10-quarter-
old entrant firm in a state in the 90th percentile for
knowledge is developmentally equivalent to 15-quarter-
old firm in a 10th percentile state.
Robustness Analysis. We conducted extensive sensi-
tivity analyses to rule out two broad sets of concerns,
the first reflecting alternative measures and estimation
techniques and the second reflecting alternative explana-
tions. A brief overview of the sensitivity analyses fol-
lows, with a detailed explication of the results provided
in the online appendix. Our results are robust to each of
these sensitivity tests.
In one set of analyses, we tested the sensitivity of
our results to alternative measures and estimation tech-
niques: (1) To address the possibility that the error terms
in the entrant and incumbent models of our study contain
common shocks that bias the estimates, we constructed
a model that jointly estimates entrant and incumbent
learning. (2) Firm output is often used in the organiza-
tional learning literature as a proxy for organizational
knowledge (Darr et al. 1995, Ingram and Simons 2002).
Accordingly, we examined a model that uses cumulative
loan output (rather than cost) to construct a measure of
external knowledge and a model that uses cumulative
loan output (rather than time) to construct a measure of
own experience. (3) Our definition of a problem reflects
a firm’s own past performance, but prior research has
also defined problems relative to others’ performance
(Greve 1998). Hence, we examined a market share-based
definition of a problem, which reflects not only own-

































































































































In Table 2.4, Model 3, we examined the e↵ects of problems on cost e ciency.
The coe cient estimate on pi,t is significant at 0.0817 for entrants and 0.0181 for
incumbents. Hypothesis 2B is tested in Table 2.4, Model 4, which includes problems
interacted with external knowledge, pi,tki,t, in the experiential learning model. The co-
e cient estimate of pi,tki,t is  0.221 for entrants and  0.093 for incumbents. Both are
significant, and a Wald test indicates the di↵erence between the two is also significant.
The net contribution of a problem to experiential learning rates, at the mean level
of external k owledge, is  0.098 for entrants and  0.053 for incumbents. Thus, the
contribution of problems to accessing external knowledge in the experiential learning
process is twice as large for entrants than for incumbents. This supports Hypothesis
2B, that entrants benefit more than incumbents from using external knowledge to
solve problems encountered in the experiential learning process.
To illustrate the role of external knowledge in the experiential learning process,
in Figure 2.2 we plotted entrant learning curves across knowledge contexts. We used
the estimates in Table 2.4, Model 4 to generate predicted median costs for entrants
relative to incumbents. We focused on the impact of being in a state in the top or
bottom 10th percentile of external knowledge. The graph highlights the observation
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Figure 2.2: Predicted Entrant Learning Curves in Di↵erent Knowledge Contexts
Posen and Chen: An Advantage of Newness: Vicarious Learning Despite Limited Absorptive Capacity
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Table 5 Marginal Effect on Vicarious Learning from a
Unit Change in External Knowledge
Marginal benefit of vicarious learning
Unaided by Facilitated by Faciltated by exp.
experience experience Total as share of total
Entrant É1066 É1020 É2086 0.42
Incumbent É3070 É0057 É4027 0.13
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We used the estimates in Table 4, Model 4 to generate
predicted median costs for entrants relative to incum-
bents. We focused on the impact of being in a state in
the top or bottom 10th percentile of external knowledge.
The graph highlights the observation that a 10-quarter-
old entrant firm in a state in the 90th percentile for
knowledge is developmentally equivalent to 15-quarter-
old firm in a 10th percentile state.
Robustness Analysis. We conducted extensive sensi-
tivity analyses to rule out two broad sets of concerns,
the first reflecting alternative measures and estimation
techniques and the second reflecting alternative explana-
tions. A brief overview of the sensitivity analyses fol-
lows, with a detailed explication of the results provided
in the online appendix. Our results are robust to each of
these sensitivity tests.
In one set of analyses, we tested the sensitivity of
our results to alternative measures and estimation tech-
niques: (1) To address the possibility that the error terms
in the entrant and incumbent models of our study contain
common shocks that bias the estimates, we constructed
a model that jointly estimates entrant and incumbent
learning. (2) Firm output is often used in the organiza-
tional learning literature as a proxy for organizational
knowledge (Darr et al. 1995, Ingram and Simons 2002).
Accordingly, we examined a model that uses cumulative
loan output (rather than cost) to construct a measure of
external knowledge and a model that uses cumulative
loan output (rather than time) to construct a measure of
own experience. (3) Our definition of a problem reflects
a firm’s own past performance, but prior research has
also defined problems relative to others’ performance
(Greve 1998). Hence, we examined a market share-based
definition of a problem, which reflects not only own-

































































































































that a 10-quarter-old entrant firm in a state in the 90th percentile for knowledge is
developmentally equivalent t 15-quart -old firm in a 10th p rc ntile state.
2.6.2.3 Robustness Analysis
We conducted extensive sensitivity analyses to rule out two broad sets of concerns,
the first reflecting alternative measures and estimation techniques and the second
reflecting al ernative explanations. A brief overview of the sensitivity analyses follows
(detailed nalyses available on request). Our results are robust to each of these
sensitivity t sts.
In one set of analyses, we tested the sensitivity of our results to alternative mea-
sures and estimation techniques: (1) To address the possibility that the error terms
in the entrant and incumbe t models of our study contai common shocks that bias
he estimates, we constructed a model th t j intly estimates entrant and incumbent
learning. (2) Firm output is often used in the organizational learning literature as
a proxy for organizational knowledge (Darr et al., 1995; Ingram and Simons, 2002).
Accordingly, we examin d a m del that us s cumulative loan output (rather than
cost) to co s ruct a measure of external knowledg and a model that uses cumulative
34
loan output (rather than time) to construct a measure of own experience. (3) Our
definition of a problem reflects a firm’s own past performance, but prior research
has also defined problems relative to others’ performance (Greve, 1998). Hence, we
examined a market share-based definition of a problem, which reflects not only own
firm past performance but also the past performance of other firms.
In the other set of sensitivity analyses, we addressed alternative explanations
that may account for our estimated results. The alternative explanations reflect
the following issues: (4) Incumbents may exhaust the external knowledge pool and,
therefore, exhibit reduced returns to seeking external knowledge. We observed that
incumbents actually learn more overall from external knowledge than do entrants.
Moreover, firms founded earlier do not exhibit reduced vicarious learning, in part
because the pool of external knowledge is growing over time. (5) Entrants in more
knowledge-rich markets may be superior learners, independent of the size of the pool of
external knowledge. To examine this possibility, we ran models that included controls
for market knowledge at founding, as well as state and Consolidated Metropolitan
Statistical Area fixed e↵ects. (6) The time pattern of entrant learning may not
reflect an intrinsic characteristic of entrants, but rather the fact that entrants are
initially ine cient and small. To examine this possibility, we compared entrants’
learning from experience to small, ine cient incumbents’ learning from experience.
(7) Inferior entrants may exit rapidly, biasing the estimation results. To examine
this possibility, we employed a Heckman selection model to account for exit. (8)
Firms may be heterogeneous in resources available to engage in the absorption of
external knowledge. To examine this possibility, we controlled for return on assets as
a proxy for resource availability. (9) The estimates may capture other mechanisms,
such as mean regression, because we do not directly observe vicarious learning (e.g.,
a specific piece of knowledge transferred between firms). To examine this possibility,
we observed that vicarious learning should be uniquely sensitive to the proximity
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and similarity of those from which one learns. We developed additional measures,
including the distance to a firm’s nearest 30 neighbors, as well as similarity in total
assets, employee count, and cost.
2.7 Discussion
We started with a puzzle. Entrants are often viewed as su↵ering from a liability
of newness because at founding, they rarely possess the knowledge and capabilities
necessary to compete and survive. They can overcome this liability by learning di-
rectly from their own experience and vicariously from the knowledge of incumbents.
But how can entrants learn from external knowledge when they lack the prior related
knowledge that forms the basis of absorptive capacity?
Our solution to this puzzle started with the observation that experiential learning
and vicarious learning, although often treated as distinct processes in the organiza-
tional learning literature, are in fact interdependent processes. The process of expe-
riential learning is fundamentally one of problem solving (Arrow, 1962; March and
Olsen, 1975), and many solutions to problems are stimulated by learning about what
other firms do. We theorized and empirically demonstrated that problems encoun-
tered in the process of experiential learning are an important trigger of the search
for external knowledge. As such, vicarious learning occurs as a by-product of the
ongoing process of experiential learning. Further, we argued and demonstrated em-
pirically that this e↵ect is particularly strong for entrants, because they lack the prior
knowledge with which to solve problems encountered in the process of engaging in
productive activity.
This paper contributes to our understanding of vicarious learning. Influential
research on absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), and the broader research
agenda on organizational capabilities, has focused significant research attention on
the ability to learn vicariously. But the ability to learn vicariously and the size of
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the external knowledge pool taken together are insu cient to explain the extent of
vicarious learning. Our study suggests that the impetus to exploit external knowledge
deserves more attention than it has so far received.
Recent research has begun to address this gap. Two ideas have surfaced in the lit-
erature. Baum and Dahlin (2007) argued that firms shift their reliance from external
to internal knowledge depending on the proximity of recent performance to aspiration
levels. Simon and Lieberman (2010) argued that firms are less likely to seek external
knowledge when internal knowledge is available. The former reflects the process by
which firms identify a problem (requiring a solution), and the latter reflects the extent
to which internal knowledge is available to solve the problem. Our theory extends
these two ideas by arguing that the experiential learning process generates the prob-
lems, and the lack of prior related knowledge drives firms to seek outside knowledge
for solutions – with both mechanisms particularly salient for new entrants.
Our theory implies that prior related knowledge plays two interdependent roles in
experiential learning. On one hand, prior knowledge engenders the ability to absorb
external knowledge. On the other hand, prior knowledge reduces the need to use
external knowledge to solve problems. The net e↵ect of prior knowledge on external
knowledge acquisition depends on which of these roles is more important in a given
context. Absorptive capacity is central to vicarious learning in many technical and
scientific domains. Yet in other domains, the issue may not be absorption, but rather
that external knowledge may be too vast and di↵used among firms to be relevant
absent problems to which it may be applied.
Consider the following example in which the impetus to get external knowledge
dominates the role of absorptive capacity. We interviewed the chief executive o -
cer of an entrant bank we call Bank Nouveau. He recounted an early problem in
the unexpectedly high number of employees needed to analyze credit. The bank
initially sought solutions to this problem within the firm. However, with limited
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internal knowledge, the problem soon triggered a search for external solutions. In
social conversation with executives from another bank, the founder of Bank Nouveau
discovered that its loan analysis reports were far more complex than necessary be-
cause they included extraneous information. By assimilating external knowledge in
the experiential learning process, Bank Nouveau reconfigured its loan analysis reports
to reduce cost and improve quality. A key feature of this example is that Bank Nou-
veau did not require significant absorptive capacity to learn vicariously (beyond that
held by any competent bank manager). Instead, all that was required was a specific
problem. The problem both generated the impetus to get external knowledge and
directed the search for external knowledge. In such situations, a lack of prior related
knowledge enhances, rather than reduces, the extent of vicarious learning.
This paper also contributes to our understanding of experiential learning. In
particular, the theory and results inform our understanding of the sources of hetero-
geneity in experiential learning rates, which is known to occur across firms and also
across new plants in the same firm (Argote and Epple, 1990). Existing explanations
for heterogeneity in learning rates center on organizational factors such as R&D and
capital intensity (Lieberman, 1984), firm specialization (Schilling et al., 2003), and
employee task environments (Wiersma, 2007). In contrast, we focus our attention
on the knowledge environment in which a firm is embedded – organizations in more
knowledge-rich contexts learn more rapidly from their own experience.
Whereas the literature on experiential learning is extensive, learning by new en-
trants has received relatively little attention. Yet, as Ethiraj et al. (2005, p. 28)
argued, “Productive knowledge ...(is)... a result of endogenous learning-by-doing pro-
cesses.” To our knowledge, our study is the first to construct and examine learning
curves for a complete census of new entrants in an industry. Our results demonstrate
just how rapidly entrants learn (in commercial banking) – e ciency improved by 30%
over the first two years. Our study also points out that the process of experiential
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learning is di↵erentially impacted by the knowledge context in which it occurs – this
knowledge context is much more salient for entrants than it is for incumbents.
This study is not without limitations. First, our data are uniquely comprehensive
at the population level, such that we are able to conduct a detailed analysis of learning
and observe high-level problems and the outcomes of solving them (i.e., e ciency
gains). However, we do not have data on the actual problem-solving event. That is,
we do not observe the interfirm knowledge flows that engender solutions to problems
arising in the experiential learning process. We address this with broad and deep
sensitivity analyses and extensive interviews with bank founders. Future research
may fruitfully examine problem solving at the intersection of experience and external
knowledge more directly. Second, the U.S. commercial banking context is well suited
for this study because, like most industries, banking is neither completely static nor
highly turbulent. As such, experiential learning, rather than R&D, is an important
driver of performance improvements. However, more research is needed to understand
the role of entrant learning in contexts marked by radical innovation and substantial
investments in R&D.
In sum, post entry learning is an important determinant of entrant performance.
The e cacy of such learning is predicated not only on internal organizational pro-
cesses but also on the knowledge environment in which an organization is embedded.
The issues surrounding learning by new entrants, and the relationship between ex-
periential and vicarious learning, remain a fertile and important line of inquiry for
organizational theorists and strategy scholars.
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CHAPTER III
Exploiting the Exploration of Others: Learning
through Collaboration in the Wireless
Telecommunications Industry
3.1 Introduction
In many industries, particularly those that are technology-intensive, substan-
tial economic activity surrounds multi-firm, innovation-oriented collaborations such
as R&D consortia (Sakakibara, 1997) and standardization of emerging technologies
(David and Shurmer, 1996). In these contexts, collaborating firms typically hold
knowledge complementary to that of a given firm, and, as such, knowledge exchange
may be central to firms realizing potential gains from collaboration (Zeng and Chen,
2003). However, prior work suggests firms have little reason to contribute knowledge
to this end. Indeed, scholars have observed that inter-firm conflict and concerns over
free-riding or unintended knowledge leakage dissuade firms from contributing (Kale
et al., 2000; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Greenstein, 1992; Hardin, 1982), while other
researchers argue firms contribute largely to facilitate the market adoption of their
own knowledge (West, 2001; Shapiro and Varian, 1999). In this study, we propose that
firms contribute knowledge to achieve complementarities with the knowledge held by
other participating firms. In particular, a firm’s knowledge contributions facilitate
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the absorption of collaborators’ knowledge and in turn enhance the firm’s subsequent
performance. We call this a collaboration-specific absorptive capacity (CSAC).
A large management literature has developed around Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990;
1989) observation that a firm’s ability to absorb external knowledge is largely a func-
tion of its internal stocks of related knowledge. Subsequent studies have examined
in finer detail the capabilities comprising absorptive capacity, such as knowledge as-
similation or knowledge exploitation (e.g., Zahra and George, 2002; Todorova and
Durisin, 2007; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Though these studies have extended Co-
hen and Levinthal’s earlier work in several important ways, the basic concept remains
the same: a firm’s internal knowledge (or capabilities) facilitates external knowledge
absorption through internal processes, isolated from the external knowledge that is
potentially absorbed.1
Within a multi-firm collaboration, however, firms are not limited to using their
knowledge to drive internal processes of external knowledge absorption. Instead, the
knowledge a firm contributes to a collaboration may also drive absorption of external
knowledge, albeit through a more instrumental and targeted process than theorized
in extant conceptions of absorptive capacity. Under the process of building CSAC de-
veloped in this study, a firm’s knowledge contributions provide a context with which
to engage in knowledge integration activities fundamental to the development of valu-
able collective knowledge. Moreover, some of the learning from this integration is
private to a firm because, as we will theorize, the knowledge contributed to a collab-
oration is typically interdependent with other private knowledge residing within the
firm. Hence, knowledge contributions enable a firm to utilize the output of collec-
tive knowledge integration e↵orts, which in turn enables the firm to better utilize its
interdependent private knowledge.
1Dyer and Singh (1998) theorize on partner-specific absorptive capacity and two-way learning
through inter-organizational routines. In contrast, the absorption in this study is not partner-specific
and is one-way in that a recipient firms’ knowledge contributions are theorized to enable vicarious
learning beyond that achievable by other collaborators who contribute less.
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This study provides an important complementary explanation to prior work that
examines more broadly the provisioning of collective knowledge (or other good). In
particular, prior work tends to assume that potentially provisioned knowledge ele-
ments are independent of one other, which leads to conflict when these elements are
distributed across multiple firms and there are more elements than can be adopted
in a given text. Alternatively, other work focuses on a single piece of knowledge
that many firms (or individuals) are equally adept at provisioning, which leads to
free-riding problems. In contrast, we argue that knowledge, particularly in systemic
technologies comprising multiple components (Winter, 1987; Teece, 1986), tends to
have many distinct components that are interdependent and di↵used across many
firms. For brevity, we say that this knowledge exhibits distributed interdependence.
The key implication of distributed interdependence is that firms contribute towards
knowledge integration at the group level in order to facilitate external knowledge
absorption at the individual level.
While knowledge contributions may benefit a firm by facilitating external knowl-
edge absorption, they also have the downside of potentially revealing valuable in-
formation on a firm’s strategy and intent to partnering firms. Unlike the internal
knowledge, capabilities, and processes that underlie prior conceptions of absorptive
capacity, knowledge contributions are freely observable to collaborators. Thus, high
levels of knowledge contribution by a firm may reveal to other firms its high expecta-
tions of the value embodied in the collaborative output. In this manner, knowledge
contributions may uncover elements of a firm’s technology strategy – that is, in-
formation that the firm is “placing its bets” in the technological areas underlying
the collaboration. Accurate signals of this form may lead other firms to re-allocate
additional e↵ort to this more fruitful direction, thereby increasing subsequent com-
petition in these technological areas. Moreover, an inevitable side e↵ect of knowledge
contributions is that it contains information about a firm’s technological approach
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within the collaboration and therefore give cues on the capabilities that best enable
a firm to utilize knowledge produced from the collaboration. Signals of this type are
particularly beneficial when there are many firms collaborating on technologies, in
which case firms may have access to a wide variety of external knowledge contributed
by other collaborators but may face considerable di culty in discerning which from
among these best facilitates innovation.
As the preceding discussion suggests, knowledge contributions have both a positive
and negative e↵ect on the value of collaborative output towards a firm’s subsequent
innovative activity. Hence, we predict a firm’s knowledge-contributing e↵orts increase
and then decrease the performance of its follow-on innovations that build from the
knowledge output of the collaboration. The positive e↵ects – that is, the CSAC that
enables a firm to understand the implications of this knowledge output – dominate at
low levels of e↵ort. In contrast, the negative e↵ect – revealing a focal firm’s innovation
strategy – dominates at high levels of e↵ort.2
The focus of this study is on multi-firm rather than dyadic collaborations for two
reasons. First, mechanisms outside of those theorized in this study tend to exert a
strong influence on participation, and its nature thereof, in a dyadic alliance, such as
trust (Gulati, 1995; Das and Teng, 1998), or contractual mechanisms (Mowery et al.,
1996). This likely reflects both (a) an ability to implement such mechanisms in a
dyadic versus a multi-party collaboration – for example, mutual trust may be di cult
to foster among many firms – and (b) the importance of each firm’s participation in
a dyadic collaboration – if one firm chooses not to contribute, then there is e↵ectively
no collaboration. Second, the proposed downside of knowledge contribution – that is,
revealing a firm’s intentions or strategy – is not applicable to dyadic collaborations
2The assumption embedded within this negative performance e↵ect is, as in much of the innova-
tion literature, that firms’ innovations compete with one another. If an innovation’s performance is
assessed using a non-competitive measure, such as a functional attribute (e.g., gas mileage), other
innovations would have no e↵ect on performance. If however (as in this study), innovation perfor-
mance is competitive (as is likely the case with patent citation counts), performance should decline
with competing innovations.
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since a firm’s contribution and e↵ort level are always highly visible when there is only
one other partner.
This study adds to our understanding of the factors influencing the extent to
which firms contribute knowledge to a multi-firm collaboration. In particular, a the-
ory is advanced wherein firms contribute knowledge to build CSAC, which in turn
serves to increase subsequent performance. The knowledge underlying the absorp-
tion process theorized here is openly observable to collaborating firms (and often to
non-collaborating firms), which implies that, unlike in most prior research, there is a
potential drawback to building absorptive capacity too rapidly.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we review prior work on
collective goods provisioning and absorptive capacity. From this backdrop of prior
work, we develop the theoretical arguments for CSAC, we elucidate the role of firm
heterogeneity to provide additional evidence of this knowledge absorption mechanism,
and we also examine the role of heterogeneity on knowledge absorption depth and
breadth within a collaboration. Next, we describe the empirical setting for this study:
the 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project), for which we have detailed firm-level
data on knowledge contributions to many (over 1000) collaborations from 1998 to
mid-2012. We then present empirical analysis and results. Finally, we close with a
discussion of contributions made by the study.
3.2 Literature Review
We begin with a review of prior research on collective (or public) goods provision-
ing to provide a context for theorizing on CSAC, which is the private learning benefit
gained through contributions to a collective knowledge pool. The main impediments
to collective goods provisioning identified in this work are free-riding and conflict.
Following this is a brief overview of work on open source software, which serves to
highlight the di culties in multi-firm collaboration more generally by comparing and
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contrasting mechanisms that overcome di culties in this specific context.
3.2.1 Under-provisioning of Collective Goods Due to Free-Riding
Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action (1965) anchored a “standard re-
sult of the theory of public goods” (Bergstrom et al., 1986, p. 25), whose basic
argument is that collective (public) goods – that is, goods that are non-rivalrous and
non-excludable, such as clean air or street lights – are under-provisioned through
voluntary contributions. Olson demonstrates that under-provisioning occurs because
(a) other agents (individuals or organizations, depending on the context) cannot be
excluded from utilizing a given agent’s contribution to a collective good (i.e., the non-
excludability noted above), and (b) contributors receive only a fraction of the benefits
of the good. Collective goods are under-provisioned even when potential contribu-
tors (e.g., individuals or organizations) have aligned interests and are increasingly
under-provisioned when misaligned interests among agents creates conflict. More-
over, under-provisioning tends to be more of an issue – and indeed collective goods
might not be provisioned at all – among a large group of organizations (or individu-
als) (Hardin, 1982; Olson, 1965).3 In such cases, selective incentives – that is private
rewards for actions by individual agents – may be necessary to induce the provisioning
of a collective good.
Olson’s under-provisioning logic suggests agents may have incentives to engage
in free-riding: since agents cannot be excluded from using a collective good, they
may refrain from providing it in the expectations that another agent will. Free-riding
behavior has been demonstrated in numerous experimental studies (e.g., Andreoni,
3While the detrimental e↵ects of larger size is the more normative view, there is some nuanced
debate in the literature. Hardin (1982) argues it is not the number of agents that is most relevant.
Rather, it is the minimal subgroup (possibly a single agent) that would benefit from provisioning the
good in absence of other agents. Chamberlin’s (1974) formal analysis suggests (somewhat common)
conditions under which provisioning of collective goods may increase with group size. In particular,
when the collective good is a normal economic good and is “inclusive” (i.e., consumption is non-
rivalrous), collective goods provisioning is non-decreasing with group size. Note that in this study, a
collective good is used as an input to innovations, often among rivals, and as such, is not inclusive.
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1988; Isaac and Walker, 1988). Moreover, as Bliss and Nalebu↵’s (1984) formal model
demonstrates, free-riding is especially problematic when agents have little information
on the cost or benefits of collective goods to other firms, in which case they engage
in a strategic waiting game to benefit from the contributions of others.
3.2.2 Under-provisioning of Collective Goods Due to Conflict
An important notion rarely discussed in prior work is that some types of collec-
tive goods, knowledge being a prime example, possess two characteristics that tend
to mitigate under-provisioning through free-riding but engenders under-provisioning
through conflict. First, there may be more di↵erent collective goods that solve a
common underlying problem than can be supported by the environment at hand.
Second, collective goods can be non-rivalrous in consumption but nevertheless rival-
rous in benefits because collective goods (knowledge, for instance) are often embedded
in a competitive context. Thus, when agents di↵er in the collective good that benefits
them the most, free-riding diminishes because agents have incentives to support their
preferred variant, but conflict increases because agents cannot agree on the collective
good(s) to provision.
To illustrate, consider scientific knowledge as a public good. Suppose multiple
university scientists each create a distinct piece of knowledge – they each discover and
publish a distinct solution to the same scientific problem – but firms cannot adopt all
of them (e.g., due to scale economy or compatibility considerations). Knowledge of
this sort is not rivalrous in consumption since one firm’s use of a given solution does
not a↵ect others firms’ ability to do so, but it is rivalrous in benefits since firms better
at applying a given solution to product markets will gain a competitive advantage.
Conflict therefore arises when firms are heterogeneous in the knowledge they are best
able to utilize. This scientific knowledge example stands in contrast to traditional
conceptions of public goods as embodied by clean air, for example. Clean air is not
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likely to su↵er from conflict-driven under-provisioning because there are no alternative
solutions to the underlying problem (a human’s need for oxygen), and the benefits of
clean air are non-competitive (i.e., people do not compete in their enjoyment of clean
air).
The negative e↵ects of conflict on collective goods have been demonstrated in the
technology standardization literature (Greenstein and Stango, 2007), though concepts
developed in this body of work apply to a broader set of collaborative settings (Farrell
and Simcoe, 2012). Formal (Farrell and Saloner, 1988; Farrell and Simcoe, 2012; Sim-
coe, 2012) , descriptive (Weiss, 1993), and empirical (Simcoe, 2012) results support
the basic conclusion that firms with conflicting interests cause under-provisioning
(e.g., as delays) in formal standardization e↵orts. Scholars have also focused consid-
erable attention on how firms overcome this conflict. One oft-cited mechanism is an
organization exerting power – gained from mechanisms such as market presence, an
installed base of captive consumers, or technological superiority – to force adoption of
their preferred variant of a collective good. Examples include Qualcomm’s attempts
to steer the wireless telephone industry to its CDMA technology (West, 2001), Mi-
crosoft’s often successful and frequently contentious e↵orts to control various elements
related to its operating system environment such as its internet browser and ActiveX
controls, and Sun’s de facto control over Java evolution (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).
Firms also overcome conflict through some form of compromise. For instance, firms
may exchange side payments to align interests, or if collective goods provisioning in
a given context is a sequential, ongoing process, firms may engage in logrolling by
trading support for each other’s interests at di↵erent points in time (Shapiro and
Varian, 1999).
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3.2.3 Provisioning of Open-source Software
Given this substantial theoretical and empirical support for the di culty in pro-
visioning collective goods, the proliferation of open source software – public domain
software developed through voluntary contributions by individuals and firms – is, on
the surface, somewhat puzzling. It is particularly surprising given the many open-
source projects in which rival firms contribute substantially (West, 2003; Dahlander
and Magnusson, 2008). As such, the open source phenomenon has attracted substan-
tial scholarly attention (e.g., Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2003; Weber, 2004; Lerner
and Tirole, 2002, to name a few).
A partial explanation for this puzzle is that open-source is not particularly vul-
nerable to conflict or free-riding. Two related attributes mitigate conflict. First,
open-source software (and all software) is substantively embodied in codified form
(e.g., as textual lines of code), in contrast to many other technological outputs in
which much of the knowledge is tacit, with perhaps only “blueprints” or a physical
product serving to codify the knowledge. Hence, contributors can more readily and
definitively assess each others’ contributions, which lessens disagreements arising from
subjective judgments. Moreover, disparate firms (or individuals) may contribute to
open source projects with minimal communication (Hertel et al., 2003), since less
tacit knowledge is necessary to integrate among di↵erent contributions than would
be required in other contexts.4 Second, open-source software tends to be highly mod-
ular so that each contribution is less likely to draw objections from users relying on
interdependent components. At a basic level, software is amenable to modulariza-
tion since it is highly codified, which facilitates partitioning software functions into
modules. Moreover, software scientists have devoted considerable e↵ort to developing
modular design techniques (CITE), and open source project architects have strong
4Large open source projects may be coordinated (and governed) by a “beneficial dictator” (e.g.,
Linus Torvalds for Linux) and a small set of “lieutenants” underneath, which is still minimal relative
to the coordination that typifies collaborations in other technological areas.
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incentives to modularize the design since contributors are di↵use.
Several mechanisms serve to overcome free-riding in open-source projects. First,
modularity in open-source reduces free-riding by providing a structure and incen-
tives to divide e↵ort (Baldwin and Clark, 2006; Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Second,
open-source o↵ers individuals incentives to contribute. Open source a particularly
attractive vehicle for individuals to signal their capabilities in the job market since
contributions are available for scrutiny by other firms (by definition) and are also
more likely to have broad rather than specialized application (Lerner et al., 2006).
Also, individuals contribute to open source for personal enjoyment because their con-
tributions are of their choosing, in contrast to project assigned to them as employees
of a firm, and are therefore more likely to match their interests and abilities (Lakhani
and Wolf, 2005). Third, several firm level incentives to contribute have been iden-
tified in the open-source and related literature. For instance, firms may have an
interest in improving open source projects that are complementary to its products
or services (Spencer, 2003; Lerner et al., 2006). Cisco’s contributions to open source
internet code, such as that found in Linux, potentially enhance the value of its net-
work equipment business. Firms may also identify good programming talent through
connections to the open source community (Lerner et al., 2006). Finally, firms may
contribute as a strategy maneuver to prevent other firms from appropriating the gains
to the contributed knowledge (Pisano, 2006).
Another threat to open source provisioning is firms making proprietary enhance-
ments and commercializing the upgraded software and shutting other contributors
out of the continued evolution of the project. On this front, legal innovations have
helped combat this form ex-post privatization and, as a result, served to sustain vol-
untary contributions as open source projects mature (Osterloh and Rota, 2007). In
particular, “copyleft” licenses such as the ubiquitous GNU Public License (GPL),
require revisions to open source codebases to remain open source.
49
3.3 Theory and Hypotheses
A central distinction we make from prior work on collective goods provisioning
surrounds the nature of knowledge and its implications for how knowledge is provi-
sioned in a collaborative context. This prior research tends to consider knowledge
or other collective good as one or more separable components that are sequentially
and independently provisioned. For example, the problems of free-riding and conflict
noted above are typically assumed to arise from provisioning a single good.5 Another
example is formal models used in work on research consortia and technology stan-
dardization that depict either a one-shot (Sakakibara, 2003) or sequential (Simcoe,
2012) game. Qualitative research often focuses attention on collaborators making
one key decision – for example, adopting Qualcomm versus another wireless technol-
ogy standard (West, 2001), or standardizing the width of a country’s railway system
(Friedlander, 1995).
In contrast, we observe that, particularly in increasingly pervasive systemic tech-
nologies (Teece, 1986; Winter, 1987), knowledge held across collaborating firms may
be interdependent, which for brevity we call distributed interdependence. Distributed
interdependence forms the basis for our theory. In particular, this implies that gains
may be realized by combining knowledge held by di↵erent collaborators. Moreover,
since substantial tacit knowledge typifies innovation-oriented contexts, knowledge in-
tegration of this sort requires active collaboration among member firms. Accordingly,
we theorize a collaboration-specific absorptive capacity (CSAC) in which a firm con-
tributes knowledge to collaboration-wide knowledge integration e↵orts, the results of
which enables the firm to realize private gains.
5A rare counterexample is (Henkel, 2004), where sequential provisioning ameliorates free-riding.
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3.3.1 Prior Conceptions of Absorptive Capacity vs. Collaboration-Specific
Absorptive Capacity
In theorizing CSAC, we build on existing conceptions of absorptive capacity (see
Figure 3.1). Much of this research has viewed knowledge outflows (e.g., sharing or
spillovers) and inflows (i.e., absorption) as arising through independent processes. In
contrast, we theorize a process in which knowledge outflows in the form of volun-
tary knowledge contributions are the impetus to absorbing external knowledge from
collaborating firms.
Cohen and Levinthal (1989; 1990) make the basic proposition that internal stocks
of relevant knowledge underlie a firm’s ability to absorb external knowledge. Subse-
quent research has made considerable progress in understanding the micro-mechanisms
within the firm that underlie absorptive capacity (see Figure 3.1). For example, Zahra
and George (2002) and Todorova and Durisin (2007) decompose the firm capabilities
underlying absorptive capacity – identifying external knowledge, recombining new
and existing knowledge, and incorporating new knowledge in firm operations – and
they theorize social integration mechanisms as an important moderator of a firm’s ab-
sorptive capacity. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) focus on observable indicators of a firm’s
internal processes, such as compensation practices and organizational structures, and
they argue that similarity in these characteristics influences a recipient firm’s ability
to absorb knowledge from a source firm. Finally, Posen and Chen (2013) demon-
strate, both theoretically and empirically, that the amount of external knowledge a
firm absorbs is a function of not just the ability to comprehend and utilize outside
knowledge but also the internal impetus to get it.
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As in our study, research in industrial organization economics has argued that
knowledge inflows through absorptive capacity requires knowledge outflows (Kamien
and Zang, 2000; Sakakibara, 2003). A crucial distinction, however, is that knowledge
outflows are not intentional contributions a firm makes to enhance external knowledge
absorption, as we theorize, but unintentional spillovers that are an unavoidable and
costly side e↵ect of conducting internal, absorption-enhancing R&D.
Closer to our study is research that suggests participation in wider “community”
may be necessary for a firm to absorb external knowledge, particularly in rapidly
evolving, technology-intensive contexts. Powell and collaborators (1996, p. 119) ob-
serve: “Passive recipients of new knowledge are less likely to appreciate its value or
to be able to respond rapidly. In industries in which know-how is critical, companies
must be expert in both in-house research and cooperative research....” Similarly, Hen-
derson and Cockburn (1998) examine firms collaborating with the academic scientific
community on basic research and applying the knowledge gained to downstream inno-
vations within the firm. They observe that firms in principle could conduct this same
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research in-house as a means to better understand and utilize the publicly conducted
research e↵orts of others, but their empirical findings are that firms collaborating
more heavily in the basic science community (i.e., co-authoring with university sci-
entists) have higher downstream innovative productivity. The implication here, as
corroborated by in-house scientists they interviewed, is a firm cannot rely solely on
internal research to build su cient absorptive capacity. Rather, “a firm’s researchers
need to be active participants in the construction of publicly available research results,
despite the issues of appropriability that such active collaboration raises” (Cockburn
and Henderson, 1998, p. 163).
In our study, we build on this line of inquiry by theorizing how participation in
a community of collaborating firms enhances absorptive capacity. As expressed by
Dahlander and Magnusson (2008, p. 632), “our understanding about how absorptive
capacity is manifested in terms of the tactics firms use to access external knowledge ...
is limited,” and we address this concern by observing that absorptive capacity is not
necessarily limited to internal, passive processes of capturing knowledge spillovers.
In particular, we raise the possibility that external knowledge may also be absorbed
through ongoing interactions with other firms.
We examine multi-firm collaborations, which we define as cooperative arrange-
ments where multiple firms pool knowledge contributions in an attempt to achieve
collective gains (Zeng and Chen, 2003). As such, we restrict attention to multilateral
collaboration, and not, for example, unilateral collaborations, such as licensing agree-
ments, whose theoretical issues lie outside the scope of the study. Firms contribute
by purposively sharing internal stocks of knowledge with other collaborating firms.
As we theorize below, it is the process of contributing this knowledge and integrating
it with other firms’ contributions engenders absorptive capacity (see Figure 3.1).
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3.3.2 Collaboration-Specific Absorptive Capacity as a Process
To clarify subsequent theoretical discussion, Figure 3.2 illustrates the process un-
derlying CSAC. The intuition behind this figure is that collaborating firms are likely
to initiate any collaboration through communications interpretable by other firms
– that is, codified knowledge. Examples include technical specifications, research
whitepapers, or an embodiment of knowledge in physical form (e.g., a deployed semi-
conductor manufacturing process or clay model of a car). The levels of codified
knowledge contributed are represented by eA and eB for representative firms A and
B. Strategic considerations aside, this level is limited by the extent to which a firm
holds knowledge relevant to the collaboration. For the sake of example, A contributes
heavily to the collaboration (eA is high) and B contributes relatively little (eB is low).
Next, tacit knowledge typically surrounds these codified contributions (though in
open-source software for example, such tacit knowledge may be very minimal). While
we illustrate only a single sequence of codified followed by tacit knowledge, this col-
laborative knowledge integration process is likely to involve repeated iterations and an
interplay between codified contributions and tacit knowledge co-development (Non-
aka, 1994) that ultimately produce a coherent piece of collective knowledge. Finally,
this collective knowledge is applied to subsequent innovations developed within in-
dividual collaborating firms.6 Since A contributes heavily to the collaboration, its
actions are more noticeable than B’s to other participants, and as such, A is prone
to having other firms notice and imitate its strategies with respect to the technology
underlying the collaboration.
6For a more formal description of this process, see the Appendix, which presents a toy model
that illustrates the mechanisms underlying the theory we develop below.
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3.3.3 Mechanisms Underlying Collaboration-Specific Absorptive Capac-
ity
Recall our claim that the basis for CSAC is distributed interdependence. Dis-
tributed interdependence, as we will argue, implies firms have incentives to contribute
because (a) a piece of knowledge may only be useful when a firm contributes and in-
tegrates this knowledge with that of other firms, and (b) a contributing firm is likely
to appropriate more of the value created through inter-firm knowledge integration
than do non-contributing firms. We elucidate these claims below.
Why does contributing knowledge and integrating it with that contributed by
other firms create value? In other words, what prevents a firm from realizing the
same gains by annexing other firms’ contributions wholly within the firm? The basis
for our ensuing discussion is that distributed interdependence, coupled with the pres-
ence of tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966), implies firms may hold knowledge that they
can only minimally utilize under their own e↵ort. As we will argue, tacit knowledge,
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which is typically pervasive innovation-oriented settings (Senker, 1995), makes knowl-
edge integration – that is, coordination across knowledge boundaries – necessary to
realize combining gains among di↵use, interdependent intra-organizational knowledge
elements (Grant, 1996; Nonaka, 1994; Kogut and Zander, 1992). While most of the
literature has focused on boundaries within a firm (e.g., between individuals), a few
studies have begun stressing the importance of knowledge integration in an inter-firm
collaborative context (Tiwana, 2008; Ireland et al., 2002). The need for inter-firm
knowledge integration in the presence of tacit knowledge is strongly evidenced in
real-world settings. Indeed, even in technology licensing where both sides of a trans-
action would benefit from a fully codified knowledge exchange, substantial knowledge
integration is usually required to transfer tacit knowledge so that the licensee can
e↵ectively utilize a licensor’s technology (Arora, 1996). Likewise, codified knowledge
exchange within a multi-firm collaborative context is also likely to require the support
of tacit knowledge exchange and attendant knowledge integration e↵orts.
Knowledge integration can in principle utilize a broad set of “arms-length” coor-
dinating devices such as rules or routines (Grant, 1996), but such mechanisms are
unlikely to be su cient for knowledge integration within innovation-oriented collab-
orations marked by substantial tacit knowledge. Instead, such collaborations tend
to entail substantial technological novelty and complexity, high unpredictability, and
inter-organizational learning that push the level of coordination required beyond that
addressable through arms-length mechanisms. As a result, knowledge integration
in these settings must utilize more communication-intensive forms of coordination
(Grant, 1996; Carlile, 2004). For instance, firms in the wireless standards context of
the present study collaborate closely through frequent physical meetings around the
world (see Section 3.4 for details). SEMATECH took this a step further, creating a
physical presence where researchers from member firms collaborated side-by-side on
R&D activities.
56
Moreover, two other reasons suggest that close collaboration is necessary. First,
close collaboration helps firms jointly discover the most valuable interdependencies.
Indeed, Henderson and Clark (1990) echo this idea in observing that a fundamental
challenge in new product architectures is discovering the design interdependencies
that matter. When the constituent knowledge elements that comprise the architecture
reside in many firms, coordination di culties and the resulting need to jointly engage
in the co-discovery process is all the more acute. Scholars have also identified a related
issue within work groups and organizations, wherein finding “who knows what” –
termed a transactive memory – is a challenge that has a strong bearing on firm’s
performance (Ren et al., 2006; Moreland, 1999). This issue is particularly salient in a
multi-firm collaborative context where limited inter-firm communication (relative to
intra-firm communication) constrains the level of transactive memory among a group
of member firms. Moreover, since novel contexts tend to reduce transactive memory
(Ren et al., 2006), close collaboration plays a more important role in uncovering
valuable interdependencies within innovation-oriented collaborations.
As an illustration of this distributed search for interdependence, CDMA technol-
ogy made it cost-e↵ective to build a “soft handover” phone that could communicate
with multiple towers simultaneously, but this created numerous hard-to-discover in-
terdependencies that straddled the expertise of technology companies collaborating
on CDMA systems development. For example, while the basic soft handover technol-
ogy exploited how CDMA codes radio transmissions, the novel paradigm of having
a single caller’s phone signal arrive at multiple cell towers simultaneously also had
a profound and ex-ante unknown e↵ect on many parts of the landline network sup-
porting the radio network. As a result, firms with highly diverse expertise engaged
in collaborative knowledge integration to discover and resolve these system interde-
pendencies.
Second, close collaboration may be necessary for the development of the common
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language necessary for e↵ective knowledge integration, particularly in the presence
of tacit knowledge. In particular, novel knowledge that typifies innovation-oriented
contexts often sits outside any established “common lexicon” used to exchange knowl-
edge (Carlile, 2004; Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003). Indeed, a common lexicon enables
diverse perspectives to contribute towards a collective e↵ort (Page, 2008). Carlile
(2004) illustrated a common lexicon through a clay model of a car that allowed, for
instance, engine designers to exchange knowledge with body designers. Knowledge
integration enables collaborating firms to amend an existing lexicon so that is suf-
ficiently rich to allow for the exchange of newly created knowledge. For example,
when CDMA (code-division multiple access) cellular phone technology was new, “few
engineers outside Qualcomm understood how the technology worked” (West, 2001),
and part of the di culty was in characterizing CDMA with the existing lexicon (and
associated concepts) of the cellular phone industry. Particularly problematic were
the “codes” in CDMA technology that in some ways displaced “frequency” (radio
frequency band), a concept that was well-understood and used heavily by the vast
majority of engineers in the cellular phone industry. Much of the lexicon (and asso-
ciate concepts) surrounding frequencies was di cult to apply to codes, so Qualcomm
had to work closely with other firms to revise the existing common lexicon (and
associate concepts) for CDMA systems development.
Recall that our discussion thus far builds on the notion that firms may be unable
to utilize some of their knowledge without complementary knowledge from other
firms. As such, a firm’s contribution and subsequent close collaboration with others
increases the value of the collective knowledge pool, both for itself and other firms.
If enlarging the value “pie” in this fashion gave rise to symmetric benefits, it is not
always clear whether firms have incentives to contribute.7 We argue, however, that
the benefit derived from a firm’s contributed knowledge is likely to be asymmetric in
7For instance, if a firm’s contributions resulted in a product option with both higher quality and
cost, it might not increase its own (or any firm’s) profits.
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favor of the contributing firm. The basic idea for this claim is that a firm is likely to
have private knowledge whose value depends on the success of integrating contributed
knowledge with that of other firms. We turn now to clarifying this claim.
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Figure 3.3 depicts the knowledge elements relevant to this argument, namely Firm
1 and 2’s knowledge contributions to the collaboration and Firm 1’s private but related
stock of knowledge.8 All firms potentially benefit from integration of Firm 1 and 2’s
contributed knowledge. As such, if Firm 1 realized no benefit beyond that available to
other firms, it might have relatively small incentives contribute or, going a step back,
develop its knowledge. Yet we contend this is rather unlikely because knowledge
is developed in the context of a firm’s existing knowledge stocks. Indeed, a firm’s
existing knowledge stocks are the underpinnnings of a firm’s “capacity for action”
(Iansiti and Clark, 1994, p. 560) that enables problem-solving and, as a consequence,
generates new knowledge (Iansiti and Clark, 1994). As such, a firm’s contributed
knowledge is likely to be interdependent with a broader set of knowledge contained
8Following the discussion above, Firms 1 and 2 contribute because their respective knowledge
contributed would have little value absent knowledge integration within the collaboration.
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within the firm, which we represent as Firm 1’s private knowledge in Figure 3.3. In
this fashion, the value of the private knowledge depicted in Figure 3.3 likely depends
on the successful integration of Firm 1 and 2’s contributed knowledge.
We illustrate this by way of a stylized example. Suppose Gamma Motors develops
advanced brake technology that enhances vehicle safety, but it requires integrating
knowledge of competitors who are more capable in other automotive systems (e.g.,
electrical. engine) on which the brake innovation depends. Absent this coordinated
knowledge integration, the brake technology has no value - it adds cost to the car but
provides no benefit. With this integration, the collective knowledge arising from the
combined expertise of several firms would create value for all firms since consumers
are willing to pay a premium for the brake safety innovation. At the same time,
Gamma Motors has a selective incentive to contribute its brake technology because
it was developed from Gamma Motors’ core R&D knowledge and capabilities, which
not only produced the “blueprints” for the brake technology itself but also, quite
naturally, tailored the brake technology to Gamma Motors’ leading edge (and private)
manufacturing capabilities. As a result, Gamma Motors is able to manufacture the
brake technology more cheaply than its competitors.
Thus, a firm have incentives to contribute because knowledge contributions en-
able a firm to learn from knowledge integration e↵orts and, in turn, enhance a firm’s
follow-on innovations. Here, we make an additional observation that knowledge con-
tributions serve not only as an external conduit to integrate knowledge and learn from
other member firms, but also as a means to promote broader internal organizational
attention (Ocasio, 1997) and buy-in to the firm’s e↵orts within the collaboration and
subsequent e↵orts to make use of the knowledge output of the collaboration. In par-
ticular, knowledge contributed to a collaboration is subject to scrutiny by other firms.
Therefore, such knowledge is likely to draw widespread attention across units in the
firm to ensure, for example, that the firm maintains its reputation (Fombrun and
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Shanley, 1990) and does not involuntarily leak its core knowledge assets (Kale et al.,
2000). Moreover, passing the scrutiny of other firms enhances the internal legitimacy
of a firm’s knowledge contributing e↵orts. Visibility and legitimacy issues may be
particularly salient in larger, bureaucratic organizations where activities within an
organizational unit are not as visible and may compete for legitimacy among many
organizational activities (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). The increased internal atten-
tion serves to further enhance the follow-on innovation benefits from contributed
knowledge.
3.3.4 Limits to Developing Collaboration-Specific Absorptive Capacity
The above discussion points to the benefits a firm sees from contributing knowl-
edge to a collaboration. Yet at higher levels, an increase in knowledge contributions is
potentially detrimental to a firm because it may reveal valuable information about the
collaboration to other firms. This information is particularly salient when collabora-
tive e↵orts are exploratory (e.g., research-oriented) (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006) and
hence marked by considerable uncertainty. Indeed, firms tend to observe and learn
from others when faced with uncertainty (Festinger, 1954; Mansfield, 1961). While
prior research in inter-firm collaborations typically focus on leakage of proprietary
knowledge (Hamel, 1991; Kale et al., 2000; Oxley and Sampson, 2004), the informa-
tion revealed by e↵ort is readily observable by members of the collaboration. The
notion that easily observed knowledge may trigger vicarious learning is reflected in
numerous studies within the management literature where firms’ imitative e↵orts are
driven not by the private know-how of other firms, but rather by the visible artifacts
of that know-how (Baum and Ingram, 1998; Simon and Lieberman, 2010; Haunschild
and Miner, 1997).
A firm’s knowledge contribution potentially reveals two valuable aspects of a col-
laboration. First, high levels of contribution reveal a firm’s high expectations on the
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value of collaborative knowledge (i.e., it will enable valuable follow-on innovations).
Of course, high expectations are not informative if they have the same likelihood of
being correct as low expectations. However, high e↵ort in contributing knowledge
is likely to reflect a more accurate assessment of collaborative knowledge quality be-
cause it likely reflects prior internal e↵ort at understanding the technological issues
that underlie the collaboration. Consistent with this notion, other studies (e.g., Türüt
and Ofek, 2012) have also assumed that signals indicating a high value for productive
inputs are more accurate than are signals indicating a low value. Hence, high e↵ort
tends to be an accurate – and therefore valuable – signal to firms with erroneously
low expectations on the quality of collaborative knowledge.
Second, a high level of knowledge contributions from a firm is likely to give cues
on the capabilities germane to utilizing the collaborative knowledge for subsequent
innovation. For instance, suppose a firm makes many contributions that specify small
components for the system design. Other firms might infer that miniaturization is the
key capability necessary for utilizing collaborative knowledge in follow-on innovations.
The notion here is conceptually that of “reverse engineering,” in which freely observ-
able artifacts – which in this study is knowledge from a collaboration rather than
observable product features – enable a firm to “decode the substantive technology”
(Kogut and Zander, 1992, p. 393) that underlies it. Assuming time-compression dis-
economies are not prohibitive (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), other firms may then reverse
engineer the relevant capabilities of the focal high-e↵ort firm.
In sum, a firm’s knowledge contributions enhance not only common but private
learning benefits from collaboration, which increases the performance of follow-on
innovation. Beyond a certain level, however, knowledge contributions lead to an
information revealing e↵ect that diminishes follow-on innovation performance. The
learning benefits of knowledge contributions tend to exhibit diminishing returns to
e↵ort because a firm can learn only as much as other firms know. On the other
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hand, the information revealing e↵ect of knowledge contributions are only salient,
for example, beyond the mean contribution level of all firms, and in this capacity
knowledge contributions may in fact exhibit increasing e↵ects of e↵ort (intuitively,
large e↵ort is highly noticeable while small e↵ort is not). This leads to the following
prediction:
Hypothesis 1: The performance of a firm’s follow-on innovations increases
then decreases with the amount of knowledge a firm contributes to a collab-
oration.
3.3.5 Inter-firm Heterogeneity and Knowledge Absorption
Firm heterogeneity is essential to the theory of knowledge absorption o↵ered in
this study since there is conceptually no knowledge to be absorbed in interactions
between identical firms. As such, we examine whether firm heterogeneity increases
the e↵ect of knowledge contributions on follow-on innovations. As discussed below,
this prediction, if supported, provides further evidence that knowledge contributions
lead to learning (knowledge absorption) and are therefore not solely a reflection of
firms advancing their vested interests.
Firm heterogeneity enables a richer set of knowledge combinations comprised of
the knowledge generated by the collaboration. Extending the single-firm notion of
novel resource combinations as a source of superior performance (Penrose, 1959; Galu-
nic and Rodan, 1998; Kogut and Zander, 1992), a focal firm may combine its own
knowledge contributions with the disparately held and complementary knowledge re-
sources of partnering firms in novel ways that no single firm can achieve on its own
(Das and Teng, 2000), thereby enhancing the potential for the collaborative knowl-
edge to lead to valuable firm-level innovations.
Yet the existence of a richer set of potential knowledge combinations is insu cient
for firm learning to occur: as discussed in the previous section, firms must interact
63
with other firms to access their knowledge. To this end, prior research has associated
di↵erences in resources (and knowledge) to a “cognitive distance” between two firms
(Nooteboom et al., 2007). Moreover, this prior work argues that inter-firm cognitive
distance increases the e cacy of learning by interaction in that the individual peo-
ple who carry out the interaction are stimulated to learn through the more diverse
knowledge and perspectives of their counterparts.9
In sum, the preceding arguments suggest firm heterogeneity enhances a firm’s
knowledge absorption through its knowledge contributions, which in turn increases
the performance of its follow-on innovations. We therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2: As firm heterogeneity increases, knowledge contributed to
a collaboration is more beneficial to the performance of a firm’s follow-on
innovations.
3.3.6 Scope of Knowledge Absorption
Under CSAC as theorized above, knowledge absorption has two dimensions. On
one hand, firms may broaden their existing knowledge base, building on the knowledge
held by other firms. As with traditional conceptions of absorptive capacity, knowl-
edge broadening in a collaborative context occurs as internal knowledge facilitates
acquisition of external knowledge, albeit through collaboration-level processes rather
than processes internal to a firm. On the other hand, firms may also deepen their
existing knowledge base (e.g., Katila and Ahuja, 2002) through knowledge contribu-
tions that trigger interactions with other firms. For example, knowledge integration
e↵orts in the collaboration may uncover potential modifications or extensions of a
9Beyond a certain point, cognitive distance may reduce the learning benefits of interaction be-
cause firms may be too di↵erent to achieve the mutual understanding necessary to engage in e↵ective
knowledge combining. However, this distance is perhaps rarely observed in multi-firm technical col-
laborations because firms often collaborate only when they have some degree of technology overlap
to begin with. For example, the majority of firms in the present context are in the wireless industry.
Moreover, the actual unit of collaboration within the present context is further subdivided into nar-
rower technological subfields – otherwise, collaboration would be unmanageable given the diversity
of technologies embodied in a wireless architecture.
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firm’s contributed knowledge that enhance its value to the firm.
Depth and breadth of search have natural interpretations within the collaborative
context examined in this study: a firm deepens its knowledge base when its follow-on
innovations build on its own contributions to the collaboration, and a firm broadens
its knowledge base when it builds on the contributions of other firms. As such,
a multi-firm collaborative context allows us to examine the e cacy of knowledge
deepening and broadening search, and their determinants thereof.
We focus on the impact of firm heterogeneity on the performance of knowledge
deepening and broadening follow-on innovations within the learning e↵ect. The argu-
ments in the preceding section suggest a greater diversity of knowledge is likely to be
garnered from a firm’s knowledge contributions when firms are more heterogeneous.
Therefore, we predict that increased firm heterogeneity is likely to benefit follow-on
innovations that broaden rather than deepen a given firm’s knowledge base:
Hypothesis 3: Firm heterogeneity is more beneficial to knowledge broaden-
ing follow-on innovations than to knowledge deepening follow-on innovations.
3.4 Context
The empirical context of the study is 3GPP, an umbrella organization comprising
several regional standards development organizations (referred to in 3GPP as “organi-
zational partners”). The activities within 3GPP are conducted by approximately 400
(at present) member firms (referred to in 3GPP as “Individual Members”), which
consists of the major manufacturers and service operators as well as a number of
smaller firms developing 3GPP-based wireless cellular technologies. Member firms
collaborate in producing a standard that seeks to establish technical interoperability
for 3GPP-based wireless data and voice services.
The focus of this study is inter-firm collaboration and the ex-post innovations that
build from this collaboration. The 3GPP context is well-suited to examining this
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concept for three reasons. First, 3GPP can be considered a “laboratory” of frequent
inter-firm collaborations that exhibit substantial heterogeneity in group composition
across collaborations and individual firms’ e↵ort levels within a collaboration. Second,
fine-grain data on firm level e↵ort within inter-firm collaborations are rarely available.
In the 3GPP context (as described in more detail below), we observe micro level data
on firm e↵ort levels within collaboration, e.g., the documents (and email discussions)
each firm contributes.10 Third, “risk set” of potential collaborators – and therefore
potential follow-on innovators – is known (namely, the set of member firms), which
allows us to account for selection bias.11
10Emails are not currently used in the empirical analysis. Beyond being di cult to code, there is
also the issue of how to combine e↵ort represented as document contributions with e↵ort represented
as email contributions.
11The knowledge generated within our empirical context could in principle lead to innovations by
non-members, but the incidence is quite low in the sample. Firms that are not members of 3GPP
may of course cite collaborative knowledge within 3GPP, but 3GPP is a relatively closed ecosystem
in that nearly all innovations building on its knowledge base come from its member base. Only 3.5%
(114/3260) of observations in our sample are from non-members, and most of those are from a single
firm. Aside from this firm, there are only 0.7% (23/3260) of observations from non-members.
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To explicate the points made above, we turn to a more detailed discussion of the
work flow within 3GPP, as depicted in Figure 3.4 (portions adapted from Leiponen,
2008). The top of the figure provides the broader setting in which firm level tech-
nical contributions are developed by showing the flow from technical concept – that
is, ideas for product features – to standardization. Feature ideas may come from,
for instance, opportunities perceived by member firms or demand from the market.
Ideas approved within 3GPP are then formalized as work items. Work item comple-
tion then continues within the specification development phase, which contains the
actual technical work within 3GPP, organized into Technical Specification Groups
(TSG) corresponding to di↵erent technical subfields of wireless system design. Once
specification development on a given work item nears completion, it is submitted to
TSG for approval and subsequent inclusion into a new or revised standards specifi-
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cation. These specifications (at the top right of the figure) define what is “in the
standard,” though the knowledge underlying the specification is codified in firm level
documentation, as we describe below.
The bottom of Figure 3.4 illustrates how firms collaborate in specification devel-
opment. Work within each TSG is organized into working groups (WG) that meet
several times per year. Meetings are organized into agenda items to solve specific
technical issues. Firms submit technical documents, or Tdocs, in advance of each
meeting for discussion, debate, and possible approval. A firm may contribute Tdocs
to some, none, or all agenda items, and all firm representatives that are present at
the meeting may participate in discussions for any agenda item. Moreover, further
discussion may take place within an email exploder organized by 3GPP. Note there
is not a stark bright line between approval or non-approval and inclusion in a speci-
fication: while knowledge within formally approved Tdocs tends to flow more readily
into a revised (or new) specification, other Tdocs may also contain knowledge that
ultimately shape specifications.
The highlighted boxes in the bottom of Figure 3.4 represent the focal items of
the empirical portion of this study. We take an agenda item from a single meeting
to be a discrete inter-firm collaboration. A single Tdoc submitted by a single firm
represents a unit of e↵ort in participating within a collaboration.12 Finally, ex-post
innovations building on this collaborative knowledge are represented by patents that
cite a Tdoc.13
The data for this study, which corresponds to the elements described in Figure
3.4 , have been collected from custom-developed scripts that “scrape” the 3GPP
website (www.3gpp.org). Data on patents have also been obtained through the
12Two issues are worth noting: (a) alternatively, we may normalize e↵ort by the content (e.g.,
length) of a Tdoc, and (b) while most Tdocs are authored by a single firm, some are authored by
multiple firms.
13It is worth noting that patents also cite the end specification, as shown in Figure 3.4, but it is
often di cult to trace firm-level ownership of text contained within specifications, as suggested by
the preceding discussion in this section.
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Harvard Patent Network Dataverse database (Lai et al., 2011) and extended to
mid-2012 using Google’s bulk patent download site (http://www.google.com/google-
books/uspto.html). Finally, financial data for firms in the sample were obtained
through COMPUSTAT.
3.5 Empirical Model
Innovation performance is modeled by the following equation:
pij =  1+ 2eij + 3e2ij + 4fij + 5bij + 6eijbij + 7eijfij + 8bijfij + controls+ ✏ij
where:
• pij is the innovation performance of firm j0s follow-on innovation that builds on
knowledge from collaboration i.
• eij is firm j0s e↵ort contributing to a collaboration i
• fij is firm distinctness (the average di↵erence between firm j and other firms in
collaboration i)
• bij is a dummy set to 1 if the follow-on innovation is knowledge-broadening
(i.e., a firm cites a knowledge contribution from a di↵erent firm) or 0 if it is
knowledge deepening (i.e., a firm cites knowledge that it contributes).
Support for the Hypothesis 1 would be indicated by  2 positive and significant, and  3
negative and significant. Support for Hypothesis 2 would be indicated by  7 positive





We measure pij as the citation count of a firm j’s patent that cites a Tdoc in col-
laboration i. Multiple patents by firm j that cite Tdocs in collaboration i are counted
as separate observations.14 Patent citations are subject to exposure e↵ects, in which
an older patent will have more citations simply because it has had more time to accu-
mulate them. To account for this, we employ a “fixed e↵ects” approach (Hall et al.,
2001) in which the raw patent citation counts are adjusted by the average number of
citations received by all patents within the same patent category (defined by Hall and
collaborators) and application (or grant) year. The fixed e↵ects adjustment therefore
indicates impact relative to other patents in the same cohort. Another feature of the
fixed e↵ects adjustment is that it accounts for changes in citation behavior (within
a patent category) across time. Table 3.1 shows the average citations received by
patents in the “Computers and Communications” category, to which nearly all (over
99%) of the patents in our sample belong. The manner in which we include fixed
e↵ects adjustment in our empirical model is described in more detail below.
14This is necessitated by control variables that are patent-specific, such as patent lag.
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Table 3.1: Average citations received by patents in the “Computers & Communica-

















E↵ort eij is measured as the number of Tdocs contributed by firm j to collabora-
tion i.
The heterogeneity measure is based on the technological positions of firms, as
defined by a vector v representing the number of patents issued to a firm in each





Thus, TAB is zero for identical firm positions and 1 for maximally distinct firms.15
We proxy firm heterogeneity with firm distinctness, fij, which is given by the
average technological distance between firm j and other firms in collaboration i.
15In a multi-industry sample, using raw patent classes might be problematic since there are too
many (and hence distance is skewed towards 1). However, in the 3GPP wireless context used in this
study, all patents in the sample are from 14 patent classes.
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Compared to a collaboration-level measure such as average pairwise distance, firm
distinctness has the advantage of accounting for di↵erences in technological positions
within a collaboration.
3.6.3 Controls
One empirical concern is that there may be endogeneity in e↵ort. A potential
cause of this is firms contribute more to collaborations when they are more knowl-
edgeable in the technological fields underlying the collaboration. We control for this
by computing the technological distance (firm pat distance) between the firm and the
technological subject matter treated in the collaboration. The former is simply the
firm’s technological position as discussed above, and the latter is imputed from the
patents citing Tdocs in the collaboration.
Since a firm’s level of knowledge contributions may reflect a larger collaborative
task (i.e., larger aggregate e↵ort), we control for the total e↵ort in a collaboration
using the total number of Tdocs (total doc count) submitted to a collaboration.
We also control for the average time lag between the knowledge contribution and
an innovation (patent lag), the former given as the date of collaboration (i.e., working
group meeting) and the latter given as the date the innovation (patent) was filed.
This accounts for the possibility that, for example, a longer lag reflects increased
investment in the innovation.
We control for the patent citation truncation discussed above by including the
average citations in a patent’s cohort (patent adjust), as given in Table 3.1. While it
would be preferable to scale the dependent variable by this factor, this would preclude
using a count model for the empirical analysis. In additional robustness analysis, we
scale the dependent variable, as discussed in the robustness section below.
Finally, we control for financial performance indicators that may a↵ect a firm’s
propensity to patent and/or the quality of the patents: profitability (ROA), liquidity
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(current ratio), and (log of) a firm’s total assets (size) to account for the possibility
that large firms are more or less proficient at patenting than small firms (all obtained
from COMPUSTAT).
3.7 Method and Results
We employ a negative binomial regression model in the empirical analysis. Two
reasons suggest that this model is appropriate. First, the dependent variable (citation
counts) is overdispersed – the variance higher than the mean. The alternative Poisson
regression model assumes equal mean and variance while the negative binomial regres-
sion models allows for variance higher than the mean. Second, the large number of
patents in the data sample that have not received any citations (i.e., a zero dependent
variable) suggests the need for a zero-inflated negative binomial model. However, the
fixed e↵ects adjustment for heterogeneity in exposure to patent citations also adjusts,
as a by-product, for large zero counts. A Vuong (1989) test statistic for non-nested
models supports this conclusion (z = 0.00 and pr > z = 0.5 in the full model).
Recall that we employ a fixed e↵ects adjustment to account for di↵erences in
patent citation counts that arise from di↵erences in the period over which a patent
accumulates data as well as cohort and time period e↵ects. We incorporate the
fixed e↵ects adjustment in the negative binomial model through an exposure variable
(also called an o↵set variable). The exposure variable is a covariate with coe cient
constrained to one, which therefore serves to transform the dependent variable from
a count to a rate.16 While the exposure variable is perhaps most naturally associated
with a time duration (e.g, hours in the sun as an exposure variable for skin cancer
counts in a population), a time duration construct may not be the best normalization
16This can be seen by observing that an additive exposure variable in the log-link function of a
count model is multiplicative in the exponentiated log-link function that reflects counts. Dividing
both sides of this exponentiated function by this variable transforms the equation from a count to
a rate estimation.
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for what the count “should be” in a given context. In the present context, the
adjustment count given in Table 3.1 is a construct that reflects a suitable baseline for
actual counts, and as such, we use this adjustment count for the exposure variable.
Table 3.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the empirical model. Results from
the empirical model are given in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
66661.749 66665.508 66660.000 66687.000 1.00
66662.339 66663.345 66660.000 66624.000 70.03 1.00
66660.701 66660.098 66660.070 66660.957 70.01 0.19 1.00
66660.774 66660.418 66660.000 66661.000 0.00 70.31 70.09 1.00
total doc count 66636.732 66630.527 66662.000 66246.000 70.05 0.53 70.08 70.08 1.00
firm pat dist 66660.359 66660.213 66660.000 66660.904 0.00 0.13 0.22 70.02 0.10 1.00
firm adjust 66661.427 66661.988 66660.186 66617.351 0.48 70.05 0.01 0.04 70.11 0.01 1.00
ROA 66660.075 66660.163 66671.479 66660.496 70.14 0.01 70.02 70.01 70.05 0.04 70.22 1.00
current ratio 66662.241 66661.377 66660.000 66669.408 70.04 70.07 70.22 0.05 70.05 0.03 70.10 0.32 1.00






Table 3.3 presents preliminary results on the tests for the hypotheses. Model 1
includes just the control variables. Notably, patent lag is positive and significant,
consistent with the idea that firms are utilizing the patent lag time window to better
understand how to incorporate collaborative knowledge in follow-on patents. Firm
size is also associated with greater citation counts, which may reflect the greater
market influence of larger firms. Finally, profitability decreases patent citation counts,
which may indicate firms are engaging in strategic patenting behavior. That is, firms
with more slack resources are better equipped for “patent portfolio races” (Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001), and are therefore strategically trading quality for quantity.
Models 2 through 7 progressively introduce the explanatory variables into the
specification. Model 2 indicates knowledge contributing level does not have an e↵ect
on follow-on innovations. But, as Model 3 and H1 suggest, this is because knowledge
contribution is misspecified in Model 2. Indeed, support for H1 would be indicated
by knowledge contributing level having an inverse-U e↵ect on follow-on innovations.
This is the case in Model 3: the coe cient on eij positive and significant, and the
coe cient on e2ij is negative and significant.
The introduction of the interaction term between knowledge contributions and
the knowledge broadening dummy, in Model 6-8, lends additional support for our
arguments for the benefits of contributing knowledge (H1). In particular, with the
inclusion of this term, the coe cient on knowledge contributions reflect firms that
build on their own contributions, which is not significant. Interestingly, however, the
net coe cient for firms that build on others’ contributions (the sum of the knowledge
contribution term and the interaction term) is significant (at the 5% level) in Model
8, our full model. This is consistent with firms building CSAC – that is, they learn
from others in the process of integrating their contributions to the collaboration –
but is not consistent with, for example, firms furthering their own interests in the
collaboration. However, our results do not imply that the latter phenomenon does
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not occur. Indeed, our results do not pick up a firm’s private knowledge that both
embodies a firm’s vested interests and precedes the firm’s knowledge contributions,
since we only examine the ex-post e↵ects of these contributions.
We now turn our attention to Hypotheses 2 and 3. Model 7 does not support H2
since the coe cient on eijfij is positive, but not significant. Moreover, Model 8 does
not support H3 since the coe cient on bijfij is not significant.
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Table 3.3: Inter-firm heterogeneity and firm’s knowledge contributions as facilitators
of follow-on innovations
!!!!!!!!(1)!!! !!!!!!!!(2)!!! !!!!!!!!(3)!!! !!!!!!!!(4)!!! !!!!!!!!(5)!!! !!!!!!!!(6)!!! !!!!!!!!(7)!!! !!!!!!!!(8)!!!
               (knowledge !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!2.956e/02!!! !!1.442e/01*** !!1.489e/01*** !!1.246e/01**! !!7.197e/02!!! !!1.012e/01!!! !!1.018e/01!!!
               contributed) !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2.150e/02)!!! (3.744e/02)!!! (3.835e/02)!!! (4.042e/02)!!! (6.448e/02)!!! (8.766e/02)!!! (9.100e/02)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !/9.791e/03*** !/9.917e/03*** !/9.015e/03*** !/7.275e/03*!! !/7.086e/03*!! !/7.084e/03*!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2.639e/03)!!! (2.649e/03)!!! (2.676e/03)!!! (3.154e/03)!!! (3.166e/03)!!! (3.168e/03)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!3.284e/01!!! !!2.992e/01!!! !!2.878e/01!!! !!1.284e/01!!! !!1.032e/01!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (5.865e/01)!!! (5.867e/01)!!! (5.863e/01)!!! (6.680e/01)!!! (1.225e+00)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !/2.391e/01+!! !/3.888e/01*!! !/3.743e/01+!! !/3.686e/01!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (1.339e/01)!!! (1.973e/01)!!! (1.992e/01)!!! (3.076e/01)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!4.682e/02!!! !!4.408e/02!!! !!4.416e/02!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (4.482e/02)!!! (4.503e/02)!!! (4.514e/02)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!1.270e/01!!! !!1.299e/01!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2.580e/01)!!! (2.839e/01)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!2.967e/02!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (1.209e+00)!!!
!!8.821e/04*** !!8.867e/04*** !!8.773e/04*** !!8.857e/04*** !!8.932e/04*** !!8.906e/04*** !!8.873e/04*** !!8.871e/04***
(9.204e/05)!!! (9.190e/05)!!! (9.063e/05)!!! (9.186e/05)!!! (9.199e/05)!!! (9.179e/05)!!! (9.199e/05)!!! (9.212e/05)!!!
!/3.468e/03+!! !/5.099e/03*!! !/5.004e/03*!! !/5.334e/03*!! !/4.506e/03+!! !/4.396e/03+!! !/4.588e/03+!! !/4.591e/03+!!
(1.953e/03)!!! (2.273e/03)!!! (2.266e/03)!!! (2.343e/03)!!! (2.390e/03)!!! (2.387e/03)!!! (2.415e/03)!!! (2.419e/03)!!!
!!3.474e/01!!! !!3.516e/01!!! !!3.083e/01!!! !!2.655e/01!!! !!2.596e/01!!! !!2.661e/01!!! !!2.597e/01!!! !!2.595e/01!!!
(2.450e/01)!!! (2.448e/01)!!! (2.434e/01)!!! (2.547e/01)!!! (2.540e/01)!!! (2.539e/01)!!! (2.541e/01)!!! (2.542e/01)!!!
!/2.688e+00*** !/2.696e+00*** !/2.600e+00*** !/2.578e+00*** !/2.542e+00*** !/2.516e+00*** !/2.521e+00*** !/2.523e+00***
(5.211e/01)!!! (5.229e/01)!!! (5.211e/01)!!! (5.226e/01)!!! (5.215e/01)!!! (5.217e/01)!!! (5.217e/01)!!! (5.246e/01)!!!
!!1.663e/02!!! !!1.569e/02!!! !!8.420e/03!!! !/1.066e/03!!! !!9.934e/04!!! !!1.126e/03!!! !/1.408e/03!!! !/1.368e/03!!!
(5.287e/02)!!! (5.275e/02)!!! (5.193e/02)!!! (5.427e/02)!!! (5.413e/02)!!! (5.401e/02)!!! (5.413e/02)!!! (5.416e/02)!!!
!!1.447e/01**! !!1.350e/01**! !!1.204e/01*!! !!1.209e/01*!! !!1.242e/01*!! !!1.248e/01*!! !!1.219e/01*!! !!1.219e/01*!!
(4.959e/02)!!! (4.975e/02)!!! (4.903e/02)!!! (4.892e/02)!!! (4.893e/02)!!! (4.885e/02)!!! (4.911e/02)!!! (4.912e/02)!!!
!/1.353e+00*!! !/1.258e+00*!! !/1.212e+00*!! !/1.143e+00+!! !/1.006e+00+!! !/8.748e/01!!! !/8.759e/01!!! !/8.806e/01!!!
(6.055e/01)!!! (6.054e/01)!!! (5.956e/01)!!! (6.064e/01)!!! (6.106e/01)!!! (6.225e/01)!!! (6.214e/01)!!! (6.499e/01)!!!
Log-likelihood !!/2144.471!!! !!/2143.514!!! !!!/2136.54!!! !!/2136.382!!! !!!/2134.77!!! !!/2134.224!!! !!/2134.104!!! !!/2134.103!!!
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To probe H2 and H3 further, we examine the possibility that the e↵ects of firm
distinctness are dichotomous. That is, when other firms are su ciently dissimilar,
learning occurs, but at some point of increasing similarity learning quickly dissipates.
Accordingly, we substitute the firm distinctness measure fij with a dummy variable
dij that is set to one for firm distinctness levels above the median. Table 3.4 presents
the results of the same tests as Table 3.3, except that this discrete measure of firm
heterogeneity is substituted for the continuous measure.
The full model (Model 8) lends support for H2 since the coe cient on eijdij is
positive and significant (at the 10% level). Nevertheless, caution must exercised in
interpreting the coe cients in count (or, in general non-linear) estimation models
(Hoetker, 2007). Accordingly, we computed marginal e↵ects at the means of the
covariates, and the coe cient on eijdij remains positive and significant at the 10%
level. The magnitude of the marginal e↵ect is 0.823 and the standard error is 0.423.
H3 is also supported in the alternative specification of Table 3.4. The coe cient
on bijdij is positive and significant, and an examination of marginal e↵ects analogous
to that performed in H2 also show significance (at the 5% level).
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Table 3.4: Inter-firm heterogeneity (as a dummy variable) and firm’s knowledge con-
tributions as facilitators of follow-on innovations
!!!!!!!!(1)!!! !!!!!!!!(2)!!! !!!!!!!!(3)!!! !!!!!!!!(4)!!! !!!!!!!!(5)!!! !!!!!!!!(6)!!! !!!!!!!!(7)!!! !!!!!!!!(8)!!!
               (knowledge !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!2.956e/02!!! !!1.442e/01*** !!1.137e/01**! !!8.818e/02*!! !!2.856e/02!!! !!1.288e/01!!! !!1.325e/01!!!
               contributed) !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2.150e/02)!!! (3.744e/02)!!! (3.890e/02)!!! (4.100e/02)!!! (6.510e/02)!!! (8.475e/02)!!! (8.457e/02)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !/9.791e/03*** !/8.645e/03**! !/7.687e/03**! !/5.712e/03+!! !/4.944e/03!!! !/4.900e/03!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2.639e/03)!!! (2.668e/03)!!! (2.705e/03)!!! (3.179e/03)!!! (3.156e/03)!!! (3.160e/03)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !/3.524e/01**! !/3.563e/01**! !/3.619e/01**! !/4.485e/01*** !/6.655e/01***
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (1.247e/01)!!! (1.245e/01)!!! (1.244e/01)!!! (1.329e/01)!!! (1.591e/01)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !/2.482e/01+!! !/4.170e/01*!! !/3.622e/01+!! !/4.859e/03!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (1.337e/01)!!! (1.976e/01)!!! (1.984e/01)!!! (2.476e/01)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!5.271e/02!!! !!4.325e/02!!! !!5.437e/02!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (4.485e/02)!!! (4.452e/02)!!! (4.470e/02)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!4.362e/01+!! !!4.643e/01+!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (2.373e/01)!!! (2.375e/01)!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!1.979e+00*!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! (8.184e/01)!!!
!!8.821e/04*** !!8.867e/04*** !!8.773e/04*** !!8.381e/04*** !!8.459e/04*** !!8.428e/04*** !!8.359e/04*** !!8.448e/04***
(9.204e/05)!!! (9.190e/05)!!! (9.063e/05)!!! (9.195e/05)!!! (9.208e/05)!!! (9.185e/05)!!! (9.189e/05)!!! (9.176e/05)!!!
!/3.468e/03+!! !/5.099e/03*!! !/5.004e/03*!! !/3.309e/03!!! !/2.460e/03!!! !/2.320e/03!!! !/3.136e/03!!! !/3.492e/03!!!
(1.953e/03)!!! (2.273e/03)!!! (2.266e/03)!!! (2.337e/03)!!! (2.382e/03)!!! (2.380e/03)!!! (2.406e/03)!!! (2.408e/03)!!!
!!3.474e/01!!! !!3.516e/01!!! !!3.083e/01!!! !!5.321e/01*!! !!5.271e/01*!! !!5.369e/01*!! !!4.963e/01+!! !!4.399e/01+!!
(2.450e/01)!!! (2.448e/01)!!! (2.434e/01)!!! (2.568e/01)!!! (2.560e/01)!!! (2.558e/01)!!! (2.559e/01)!!! (2.563e/01)!!!
!/2.688e+00*** !/2.696e+00*** !/2.600e+00*** !/2.775e+00*** !/2.731e+00*** !/2.704e+00*** !/2.725e+00*** !/2.815e+00***
(5.211e/01)!!! (5.229e/01)!!! (5.211e/01)!!! (5.293e/01)!!! (5.283e/01)!!! (5.287e/01)!!! (5.295e/01)!!! (5.331e/01)!!!
!!1.663e/02!!! !!1.569e/02!!! !!8.420e/03!!! !!3.056e/02!!! !!3.139e/02!!! !!3.144e/02!!! !!1.137e/02!!! !/1.038e/02!!!
(5.287e/02)!!! (5.275e/02)!!! (5.193e/02)!!! (5.342e/02)!!! (5.324e/02)!!! (5.314e/02)!!! (5.352e/02)!!! (5.342e/02)!!!
!!1.447e/01**! !!1.350e/01**! !!1.204e/01*!! !!9.840e/02*!! !!1.014e/01*!! !!1.018e/01*!! !!8.691e/02+!! !!7.756e/02!!!
(4.959e/02)!!! (4.975e/02)!!! (4.903e/02)!!! (4.972e/02)!!! (4.967e/02)!!! (4.958e/02)!!! (4.976e/02)!!! (4.967e/02)!!!
!/1.353e+00*!! !/1.258e+00*!! !/1.212e+00*!! !/8.254e/01!!! !/6.676e/01!!! !/5.110e/01!!! !/3.026e/01!!! !/6.374e/02!!!
(6.055e/01)!!! (6.054e/01)!!! (5.956e/01)!!! (6.135e/01)!!! (6.188e/01)!!! (6.323e/01)!!! (6.363e/01)!!! (6.406e/01)!!!
Log-likelihood !!/2144.471!!! !!/2143.514!!! !!!/2136.54!!! !!/2132.559!!! !!/2130.818!!! !!/2130.128!!! !!/2128.452!!! !!!/2125.42!!!
Observations !!!!!!!1497!!! !!!!!!!1497!!! !!!!!!!1497!!! !!!!!!!1497!!! !!!!!!!1497!!! !!!!!!!1497!!! !!!!!!!1497!!! !!!!!!!1497!!!
+!p<0.10,!*!p<0.05,!**!p<0.01,!***!p<0.001
Dependent!variable:!Firm!j's!aggregate!citation!count!of!patents!that!cite!the!output!of!collaboration!i.
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                  distinctness
                  dummy)
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In this section, we discuss potential issues with the main empirical analysis and ro-
bustness checks to address these. First, citation counts are found to be representative
of a patent’s “impact” (e.g., market value) (Hall et al., 2005), but there is variation
in how it is incorporated as a performance measure. As in this study, some studies
simply use the raw citation count (e.g., Gittelman and Kogut, 2003), which discounts
the value of the patent itself (i.e., absent forward citations) to zero. Others use some
form of citation-weighting to give a positive value to the patent (e.g., Trajtenberg,
1990; Sampson, 2007). In earlier model specifications, we conducted alternate analy-
ses using a citation-weighted count as the dependent variable (we weight the patent
and citations equally), and results were robust to the alternative specification.
Second, firms self-select into the group that patents within each collaboration.
To address this in our model specifications, we employed a Heckman selection model
(using OLS in the second stage) in which we include the pool of potential patenters
(i.e., any firm that has a follow-on innovation) as first stage observations for every
collaboration. Since this alternative specification is no longer a count model (so that
the exposure method above is not applicable), we applied a “fixed-e↵ect” scaling to
the dependent variable to adjust for citation truncation issues. Results were robust
to this alternative specification.
3.9 Discussion
In many technology intensive industries, multi-firm collaborations are an impor-
tant means by which firms conduct their productive activities. At the core of this
study is the notion that a firm’s knowledge contributions facilitate absorption of
knowledge from collaborating firms, which serves to increase the firm’s follow-on in-
novation performance. A key distinction from prior conceptions of absorptive capacity
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is that absorption is facilitated by observable knowledge contributed to a collabora-
tion and not by internal knowledge-building e↵orts. In particular, knowledge con-
tributions may reveal to partnering firms the quality of the knowledge produced by
the collaboration and the capabilities necessary to exploit this knowledge, which de-
creases the follow-on innovation performance of a focal firm as other firms become
better equipped to develop competing innovations. We find support for these pre-
dictions using extensive data on collaborative development e↵orts within the 3GPP
wireless standards organization.
This study contributes to refining knowledge-based explanations of inter-firm col-
laboration. Indeed, prior work has observed that “a key feature of knowledge-based
explanations of alliances is imprecision around the concepts of organizational learn-
ing, knowledge sharing, and knowledge transfer” (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). We
make some headway towards addressing this issue by elaborating the role of knowl-
edge integration in a multi-firm collaborative context. In particular, we conceptu-
alize knowledge sharing within a collaboration as a codified contribution followed
by subsequent integration e↵orts that typically involve tacit knowledge. Under this
conceptualization, outbound contributed knowledge acts as the impetus for inbound
knowledge transfers from the collaboration and subsequent learning within the firm.
The theory developed in this study has implications for the emergence of perfor-
mance di↵erentials within multi-firm collaborations. In particular, heterogeneity in
relevant internal knowledge stocks leads to heterogeneity in knowledge contributed to
the collaboration, which in turn gives rise to di↵erences in the amount of knowledge
absorbed from partnering firms and ultimately results in inter-firm performance dif-
ferentials. In contrast to most prior work on multi-firm (and dyadic) collaborations,
where performance advantages arise from access to partners’ core, protected resources
and capabilities (Lavie, 2006; Kale et al., 2000; Sakakibara, 2002), the theory in this
study suggests inter-firm performance di↵erentials may arise from freely observable
82
knowledge contributions. Observable knowledge contributions may be the stronger
source of performance di↵erentials in collaborations among many firms, in which case
firms’ proprietary knowledge may be more highly guarded due to the di culties in
establishing trust- or familiarity-based relationships within a large set of firms.
This study contributes to reconciling cooperative and competitive aspects of multi-
firm collaborations. As Jorde and Teece (1990, p. 76) note, “very little literature ad-
dresses how cooperation among competitors can promote competition.” This study
raises one possibility: an underlying competition to reap ex-post benefits may emerge
in cooperative contexts, and the driver of these benefits is knowledge contributions to
facilitate knowledge absorption within a collaboration. The notion that competition
may emerge within cooperation adds a pro-competitive argument to broad policy
concerns over potential anti-competitive (e.g., collusive) behavior within multi-firm
collaborations (Anton and Yao, 1995; Goeree and Helland, 2012).
In this study, we theorize that knowledge contributions underlie an important but
under-examined process of knowledge absorption within multi-firm collaborations.
Since prior work on multi-firm collaborations typically focuses on ex-ante character-
istics of the collaboration such as knowledge diversity or experience among member
firms, this study represents an early e↵ort at examining activity within a collabora-
tion. As such, there is substantial opportunity for future work to shed light on the




Gambling on the Past: Risk Taking as a Learned
Response to Problem-Solving
4.1 Introduction
A wide variety of “problems,” such as technology discovered to be dangerous
(asbestos), increased competition, or industrywide shocks (a fuel shortage for SUV
makers), may force a firm to replace existing practices with ones more suited to its
newfound circumstances. While management scholars have stressed the importance
of tackling problems to a firm’s long-run organizational learning and performance
(e.g., Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Nickerson et al., 2012; Cyert and March, 1963;
Arrow, 1962), problem-solving also comes with substantial risk because firms lack
the knowledge to respond e↵ectively, leading them to search across, and perhaps
temporarily adopt, alternatives that can vary widely in quality (March and Simon,
1958; Amburgey et al., 1993; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). A seemingly obvious means
to reduce this risk is through anticipatory exploration – that is, exploration prior to a
problem – to accumulate a “knowledge inventory” (Levinthal and March, 1993) that
guides post-problem solution-finding and subsequent adaptation. We demonstrate
that there are conditions under which this line of reasoning is not fully correct because
anticipatory exploration engenders endogenous risk seeking in a firm’s subsequent
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problem-solving e↵orts.
One prevalent theme in extant work is that firms’ lack of knowledge makes adap-
tation in the face of such problems risky. For example, research within the behavioral
theory of the firm suggests that insu cient knowledge on available alternatives may
result in performance below an organizational aspirational level, which leads firms to
engage in an uncertain process of experimentation and search to raise performance
above aspirations (Miller and Leiblein, 1996; March and Shapira, 1987). Research
on firm entry provides another example, wherein a lack of pre-entry knowledge in-
creases the binary risk of organizational failure (Klepper and Simons, 2000; Helfat
and Lieberman, 2002; Dencker et al., 2009). Here, a lack of knowledge not only clouds
the decision to enter but also stifles its ability to learn and adapt conditional on entry
(Dencker et al., 2009).
We o↵er the alternative possibility that adaptation is risky because firms inher-
ently gravitate to riskier alternatives when a problem forces change, even when firms
are risk-neutral. The basis for this claim is the endogenous emergence of risk pref-
erences in risk-neutral search. While prior work finds that, absent problems, agents
(e.g., firms) exhibit apparent risk aversion under risk-neutral search (March, 1996;
Denrell and March, 2001), we find agents exhibit apparent risk-seeking in reaction
to a problem. In particular, we focus not on policy choices adopted in a static en-
vironment, but rather on the once-discarded choices to which a firm turns after a
problem renders an existing policy decision unviable. It is in this latter regime where
an increase in anticipatory exploration may result in increased risk-seeking within a
firm’s problem-solving e↵orts.
In this study, we seek to demonstrate that these two sources of risk in adapting to
problems – insu cient knowledge and a search bias toward risky alternatives – gives
rise to a tradeo↵ in anticipatory exploration. On one hand, anticipatory exploration
reduces adaptation risk by augmenting a firm’s knowledge inventory (Levinthal and
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March, 1993) that can be used to solve a problem. On the other hand, anticipa-
tory exploration also increases adaptation risk by biasing risk-neutral agents towards
riskier solutions to a problem. In other words, anticipatory exploration reduces perfor-
mance variability across di↵erent alternatives a firm selects in its attempts to solve
the problem but increases performance variability attributable to variation within
each alternative selected. Therefore, we find that exploration may either increase or
decrease riskiness in responding to problems, depending on a firm’s strategies and the
environment in which it operates.
We elucidate our theory using a multiarmed bandit model (Gittins and Jones,
1979). This model has been used to examine the tradeo↵ between exploration–ex-
ploitation in a wide variety of fields, including economics and statistics (Berry and
Fristedt, 1985; Gittins, 1979; Robbins, 1952), computer science (Holland, 1975; Sut-
ton and Barto, 1998), and internet engineering (White, 2012). In the management
literature, March and his collaborators have used the bandit model extensively to
examine organizational learning (e.g., March, 1991, 1996, 2003, 2010; Denrell and
March, 2001).
We apply the bandit model to analyzing a simple organization where managers
are faced with the task of choosing one of many alternatives under uncertainty. In
each period, the organization may choose to continue with the previously selected
alternative or select a di↵erent one. The payo↵ for choosing a given alternative reflects
a stochastic draw with alternative-specific mean and variance. Within this process
of sequential decision-making, the organization seeks to maximize cumulative returns
over time. Due to uncertainty, the organization makes its choice in each period based
on its imperfect beliefs about the expected returns to each of the alternatives. In
the absence of perfect knowledge, the organization employs a strategy that allocates
e↵ort between (a) exploiting the alternative currently believed to be superior and (b)
exploring alternatives that currently seem less promising in the hopes of identifying
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an alternative superior to the currently preferred alternative.
We assume a simple model in which a problem emerges after a period of stability.
That is, a firm’s adopted alternative (i.e., the alternative it most frequently selects)
becomes unviable due to a change in the circumstances under which the firm operates
(e.g., videocassette technology is obsolete after the emergence of DVD). Moreover, we
add the stringent assumption that knowledge accumulated on other alternatives prior
to the problem does not degrade afterwards. Even with this assumption, we find that,
under suitable conditions, the increase in adaptation risk from endogenous risk seeking
outstrips the decrease in adaptation risk from greater knowledge on alternative policy
choices.
To illustrate our theory and model of risky adaptation in response to a problem,
consider a pharmaceutical firm searching for its next major drug to develop. The firm
is concerned that a narrow focus on exploiting one of the first promising prospects
it finds might lead to di culties in adapting to environmental change. In particular,
if the firm encounters a problem with the drug and is forced to quickly adopt a
replacement, its best bet may be to revisit the alternatives originally discarded in
favor of this drug, but this would entail risky experimentation because of the firm’s
exploitive search strategy. As such, the firm decides to explore fairly broadly and
eventually finds a drug to take to clinical trials – call this drug A. Suppose further
that a problem subsequently renders drug A unviable (e.g., a side e↵ect emerges
during late stage trials). Armed with the knowledge from prior exploration, the firm
is able to determine, with low-risk post-problem experimentation, what it thinks to be
an e↵ective alternative suited to the new environmental regime. Despite this, the firm
finds, to its surprise, that adaptation is risky not because of volatile experimentation
across di↵erent alternatives, but because of high risk (i.e., variable performance) in
the development path within the new drug it has adopted.
Thus, the pharmaceutical firm finds anticipatory exploration to be a double-edged
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sword for adapting to a problem, both enhancing knowledge that guides adaptive
e↵orts and biasing the unit towards choosing riskier alternatives post-problem. How
might this bias towards risky alternatives arise? Consider that the firm receives noisy
feedback from anticipatory exploration across di↵erent alternatives. The unit is likely
to see unusually good feedback from at least a few of the risky (i.e., high variance)
alternatives, while the unit will see neither unusually good nor unusually bad feedback
on low risk (low variance) alternatives. Hence, the R&D unit is likely to believe that
one of the high variance alternatives is the best contingency to a future problem.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe
the canonical multi-armed bandit model and how we adapt it to analyze riskiness in
problem-solving. I then use the model to analyze the main claim of the paper – that
increased exploration prior to the emergence of a problem may in fact increase risk
in finding a solution to the problem. Following this, I examine the sensitivity of the
model to assumptions on how firms form beliefs on the alternatives and the strategies
they employ for exploring di↵erent alternatives. Finally, I conclude with a discussion
of the contributions made by this study.
4.2 Model
The term “multi-armed bandit” refers to the analogy with a bank of slot machines
each with an arm that gives a noisy reward when pulled. In the conventional bandit
model, an agent performs a trial by selecting one of these arms in a given time
period. Arms are heterogeneous in payo↵s (i.e., average rewards). Through repeated
trials on this bank of slot machines over time, a player’s objective is to “maximize
... (cumulative) winnings by concentrating ... plays on the best levers” (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). The salient point of the bandit model is that information on the
merit of an arm is only obtained by selecting an arm. The bandit model has been
applied widely to practical applications such as project budget allocation in a large
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organization and routing algorithms in communication networks. The bandit model
has also been used as a device to examine various issues in economics (Bergemann
and Valimaki, 1996) and strategy (Posen and Levinthal, 2012).
The multiarmed bandit can be mapped to an organizational context by viewing
firms as adopting exactly one from among a set of possible policy alternatives at any
given time period. The reward (performance) a firm receives choosing an arm i is
given by a mean payo↵ for the alternative plus an alternative specific noise term, i.e.
ri = pi + ⌘i, (4.1)
where pi is a payo↵ drawn from a fixed underlying distribution and ⌘i is a Gaussian
noise term. The payo↵s, pi, are independently drawn for each arm of each firm prior
to the first search iteration and remain stable throughout all time periods (i.e., pi
is a “true” payo↵ for alternative i that is drawn from a Bayesian prior probability
distribution, which is specified below). The noise term ⌘i is drawn independently
each time a firm selects arm i to represent noisy measurements of the underlying true
payo↵ pi.
We assume firms are boundedly rational as they engage in sequential decision-
making within the multiarmed bandit model. Two constructs are central to this
decision-making process. First, firms hold beliefs – that is, assessments – on the
merits of the N alternatives (or arms) from which they must choose. At each time
period t, firms select one of these N arms based on their beliefs, and they update
their beliefs based on the outcome of this selection. We set beliefs of arm i for each
firm to be the average reward from all prior trials of that arm. Thus, the belief qi,t








where the sum ranges over all time periods up to (and including) t in which arm i
was selected, and k is the number of times i has been selected.
Second, firms are assumed to employ a search strategy. One choice would be an
optimal strategy that maximizes cumulative rewards, assuming such a strategy exists.
While Gittins and his collaborators (e.g., Gittins and Jones, 1979; Gittins, 1979) have
proved the existence of an optimal strategy for the multiarmed bandit (under certain
conditions), it is computationally intractable to implement for all but a limited set of
assumptions (Gans et al., 2007). Moreover, research suggests that, in practice, firms
(or individuals) often use much simpler heuristics when confronted with bandit-like
decision problems (Meyer and Shi, 1995). Indeed, a heuristic commonly assumed in
a diverse bandit literature is one in which firms simply choose the alternative that
provides the highest expected reward in the current time period (e.g., Gans et al.,
2007).
This simple heuristic is known as the greedy algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
However, since the extent to which firms exploit good alternatives is central to this
study, a strategy that allows for tuning the degree of exploration is needed. The
canonical method for modifying the greedy algorithm to incorporate exploration is
the ✏-greedy algorithm, and I adopt this modified strategy for the analysis below. In
the ✏-greedy algorithm, agents choose a random alternative with probability ✏ and are
otherwise greedy (i.e., choose the arm for which they hold the highest belief). Hence,
✏ = 0 represents a fully exploitive (greedy) strategy in which a firm always selects the
alternative believed to be best and ✏ = 1 represents the opposite extreme whereby a
firm chooses an alternative randomly. Importantly, ✏-greedy strategies consider only
the rewards of alternatives, not their variances – in this sense, it represents search by
risk-neutral agents.
To simplify our analysis of the e↵ects of problems on firm policy choices, we
construct a task environment where firms must select an alternative post-problem
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that is di↵erent from the one they adopted (i.e., selected most often) pre-problem.
In our model, we implement this by partitioning time periods into a pre-problem
interval in which the environment is fixed for I = 50 periods, and a post-problem
interval in which firms cannot select the pre-problem alternative they adopted. We
simulate I+2 periods because 2 periods in the post change environment are required
to observe post change performance risk.
Our main theoretical concern is whether environmental change a↵ects performance
risk (i.e., performance variability) through a lack of knowledge on good alternatives
– that is a lack of experience in trialling these alternatives – or the underlying vari-
ability within each selected alternative. As such, we define measures of reliability






where pi is as in Equation 4.1. ⇢e(t) reflects the notion that when firms lack informa-
tion on which alternative is best, they are likely to select di↵erent alternatives that







where ⌘i is as in Equation 4.1 . ⇢v(t) reflects the notion that when firms select noisy
(i.e., high variance) alternatives, rewards vary considerably from one period to the
next even if they select the same alternative.
The opportunity structure of the environment is defined by initializing the payo↵s,
pi, of a 10-arm bandit model. pi are drawn from a uniform U( 1, 1) distribution.
Moreover, we assume firms know the distribution from which payo↵s are drawn and
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set their initial beliefs on all alternatives, qi,0, to zero, the mean of this distribution.1
Finally, we introduce heterogeneity in the risk (variance) of each alternative by setting
half of each firm’s alternatives to be low variance, i.e., ⌘i is deterministic (i.e., zero
with zero variance), and setting the other half of each firm’s alternatives to be high
variance, i.e., ⌘i is drawn independently for each arm and each time period from a
N (0, 4) distribution. Thus, firms are (on average) risk neutral if the average variance
of the alternatives they select is two. The variance of arms are set independently of
variance so that, for example, firms would be risk neutral if they were able to identify
the best alternative with certainty2
All simulations of the model are seeded with 25,000 firms, each facing a distinct
environment initialized in this fashion.
4.3 Analysis
We employ the multiarmed bandit model described above to study the sources of
performance reliability degradation under environmental change. Doing so requires
setting a number of parameters. First, we define the opportunity structure of the
environment by drawing the payo↵s, pi, from a uniform U( 1, 1) distribution. Second,
we assume firms know the distribution from which payo↵s are drawn and set their
initial beliefs on all alternatives, qi,0, to zero, the mean of this distribution. Third, we
seed each simulation of the model with with 25,000 firms, each with 10 alternatives
from which to choose. The environment is set independently for each firm – that is,
the payo↵s for each arm of each firm are drawn independently and identically from a
uniform U( 1, 1) distribution.
The analysis comprises a test of our main proposition on the e↵ects of exploration
1Another possibility commonly employed is to assume agents know the underlying distribution
of payo↵s and possess initial beliefs that are randomly drawn from this distribution.
2Doing so clarifies the mechanisms underlying our theory. Our main findings in Figure 4.1 are
robust to continuous distributions on the variance alternatives (e.g., variance of alternatives drawn
from U(0, 2)) [do this]
92
on post-problem performance risk and tests of the sensitivity of our main results
to a firm’s method for forming beliefs and a firm’s strategy for exploring di↵erent
alternatives.
4.3.1 Main Experiment
Our main experiment examines the e↵ects of increased exploration on the perfor-
mance risk that firms face as they respond to a problem with an adopted alternative.
Per our theory, we decompose risk into inexperience risk and selection risk in the
analysis that follows.
In Figure 4.1, we compare performance risk immediately pre- and post-problem as
a function of exploration (i.e., as a function of the ✏-greedy parameter ✏). We examine
low and moderate levels of exploration where the tradeo↵ between inexperience and
selection risk is most evident. Figure 4.1a shows the change in risk from the last
period pre-problem (t = 50) to the first period in which post-problem risk is defined
(t = 52). In Figure 4.1a, we focus on pre-problem risk. The solid line in this figure
indicates performance risk increases with exploration. The increase in inexperience
risk (“o” markered line) embodies a basic compromise of greater exploration: per-
formance variation increases as firms gather more information across all alternatives
through exploratory trials. Note here that we have decomposed inexperience risk into
a pure (“o” markered line) and an interaction component (“x” markered line), the
latter reflecting additional inexperience risk (i.e., performance variation in selected
alternatives) induced by noise in each alternative. The e↵ects of this interaction have
largely disappeared after 50 periods pre-problem. Finally, the increase in selection
risk (triangle markered line) reflects risk aversion in alternatives selected by the (risk-
neutral) firms in this experiment. Risk aversion is most pronounced at low levels of
exploration, which we discuss in greater depth in Sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.3.
We now turn attention to post-problem risk (Figure 4.1b), which is at the core of
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our theorizing. All firms are greedy post-problem – that is, they select the alternative
believed to be best – which eliminates the contribution of random exploration to risky
adaptation and allows us to isolate our analysis on the competing e↵ects of inexperi-
ence and selection risk. Figure 4.1b shows that the post-problem risk associated with
firms’ actions declines as exploration increases from ✏ = 0 to ✏ = 0.1. As the mark-
ered lines indicate, this is due to a decrease in inexperience and (to a smaller extent)
selection risk that dominate the increased interaction between the two. The decrease
in inexperience risk is simply a result of firms holding more information across all
alternatives. We defer discussion of post-problem selection risk to Sections 4.3.1.1
and 4.3.1.3.
Corroborating the central claim of this study, post-problem risk increases as ex-
ploration increases from ✏ = 0.1 to ✏ = 0.4. Increased exploration within this range
leads to a continued decline in inexperience risk, which is consistent with gaining
more knowledge about all alternatives.3 However, increased exploration also leads to
increased selection risk (triangle markered line), which dominates overall performance
risk at higher levels of exploration (solid line). Hence, as we theorized, pre-problem
exploration increases post-problem risk seeking. We analyze this in greater detail in
Section 4.3.1.3.
4.3.1.1 Selection risk as variance of selected alternatives
The preceding results show that riskiness in adapting to environmental change is
driven by two competing e↵ects. On the one hand, exploration reduces inexperience
risk by enhancing a firm’s knowledge across alternative choices. This result confirms
a simple corollary to an issue identified in prior research: if a lack of experience
(knowledge) on alternatives makes adaptation risky, then exploration should reduce
3While the interaction between inexperience and selection risk is non-trivial in this range of
exploration, it is relatively flat and hence does not contribute significantly to an overall rise or
decline in performance risk.
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Figure 4.1: Performance risk pre and post problem
(a) pre-problem risk (t = 50)




















(b) Post-problem risk (t = 52)




















risk associated with inexperience. On the other hand, exploration increases selection
risk, which dominates the knowledge-based reduction in inexperience risk gained at
higher levels of exploration. In the discussion below, we examine more closely why
pre-problem exploration increases post-problem (and pre-problem) selection risk.
Selection risk directly reflects the variance of the alternatives a firm selects (i.e.,
the variance of ⌘i in Equation 4.1, where i is the alternative selected by a firm in some
time period). As such, we graph the variance of selected alternatives as a function of
exploration, averaged across the firms in the experiment (see Figure 4.2a). As Figure
4.2a shows, prior to environmental change (solid line), firms are highly risk-averse at
low ✏ but become less so as ✏ increases. Post-problem, firms become progressively
more risk seeking at higher levels of exploration (from ✏ = 0.1 to ✏ = 0.4). This
is consistent with the increase in selection risk that drives the overall increase in
post-problem performance risk (i.e., as shown in Figure 4.1b).
Figure 4.2 illustrates a risk-reward tradeo↵ of adaptation: increased pre-problem
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Figure 4.2: Pre- and post-problem variance and performance of alternatives selected
by firms
(a) Variance







































































exploration engenders both riskier adaptation (cf. Figures 4.1b and 4.2a) and higher
performance (cf. Figure 4.2b) post-problem. This increased performance lends addi-
tional support to our assertion that increased pre-problem exploration should lead to
better information on the best alternatives to select post-problem.
4.3.1.2 Variance of alternatives selected pre-problem
The prior section connected selection risk to the variance in a firm’s selected al-
ternatives. In this and the next section, we unpack how (risk-neutral) firms form
risk preferences (i.e., prefer low or high variance alternatives) within a search process
that seeks to maximize cumulative rewards. We begin by analyzing the pre-problem
case and proceed by considering how frequently firms’ high variance alternatives are
selected (since this determines risk preference). Figure 4.3a shows the percentage of
times high variance alternatives are tried (on average) across strategies and across
three di↵erent points in time of the experiment. Firms are initially risk-neutral (i.e.,
they select high variance alternative approximately 50 percent of the time) across
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Figure 4.3: Endogenous risk aversion pre change
(a) All firms




































(b) Decomposed, positive vs. negative first signals
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negative, t = 5
negative, t = 50
strategies since, with no samples from which to form informed beliefs, firms are select-
ing randomly with respect to variance. However, the figure also shows firms become
progressively more risk averse over time, and more so at lower levels of exploration.
How does this risk aversion emerge? To see how this arises, we decompose the
high variance alternatives according to whether the first signal – that is, ri from the
first trial – is negative or positive (Figure 4.3b). Since high variance alternatives
are equally likely to have positive and negative first signals, the average of the two
lines in this Figure (for a given t) gives the total percentage of times a high variance
alternative is selected. The salient feature here is the asymmetry in the fraction of
high variance trials over time. This asymmetry appears because exploitation entails
rapid decisions on which alternatives are inferior: early negative signals lead firms
to perceive an alternative as bad, so in an e↵ort to exploit better alternatives, the
firm decreases (perhaps prematurely) trials on this alternative. Consistent with this
notion, Figure 4.3b shows that negative first signal alternatives are rapidly ignored
by the firm, particularly at lower levels of exploration. Since negative initial signals
typically reflect negatively biased beliefs on the payo↵ of an arm, negative belief biases
97
on high variance arms tend to persist over time. In contrast, positive initial signals,
which typically reflect upwardly biased beliefs on alternatives, self-correct through
repeated trials. The net e↵ect is that firms on average hold negatively biased beliefs
on high variance arms (and, of course, unbiased beliefs on low variance arms), which
leads to firms favoring low variance arms. In other words, firms appear risk averse
prior to environmental change.
4.3.1.3 Variance of alternatives selected post-problem
We now focus attention on the variance of alternatives a firm selects immedi-
ately post-problem, which determines post-problem selection risk. This variance is a
function of a firm’s beliefs on the merits of di↵erent alternatives, as formed through
the firm’s sequential decision-making strategy prior to environmental change. Simply
put, a firm will select a high (low) variance alternative immediately post-problem if it
believes a high (low) variance alternative to be best. Hence, we and compare a firm’s
maximum beliefs within its high and low variance subsets of (non-modal) alternatives
(because, by construction, the modal alternative cannot be selected post-problem).
Figure 4.4 shows the maximum beliefs firms hold on their high and low variance
set of alternatives as a function of exploration. Note that for all levels of exploration
✏ (except near 0), firms believe a high variance alternative is best, or, equivalently,
the maximum belief on firms’ high variance sets are higher than the maximum belief
on their low variance sets. Moreover, the di↵erence in beliefs between high and
low variance sets increases with exploration, which is important to explaining why
post-problem selection risk increases with exploration (see Figure 4.1b).
Why do firms believe the best alternative is high variance, and increasingly so with
exploration? To gain insight on this, we decompose the maximal belief on the low and
high variance set of alternatives into (a) the contribution from a single alternative –
specifically, the alternative with highest true payo↵ – and (b) the contribution from
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Figure 4.4: Beliefs on low/high variance alternative subsets






















inclusion of the rest of the (non-modal) alternatives.
As the triangle-markered line in Figure 4.5b indicates, the main driver of increas-
ingly disparate beliefs on the high versus low variance set is that, within the high
variance set, there is a large gain from inclusion of multiple alternatives, and this
gain grows with exploration.4 The substantial increase is due to an aspiration e↵ect
of exploration, a diversity e↵ect of exploration, and their interaction. The aspiration
e↵ect refers to the notion that exploration uncovers increasingly superior alternatives,
which elevates the level at which beliefs on subsequently chosen alternatives cease to
self-correct. The diversity e↵ect is a high maximum belief on a set of alternatives
when measurements on each individual alternative are noisy, making it highly likely
that at least a few measurements are positively biased.5 Within the high variance set,
inclusion of additional alternatives has a large impact on maximum beliefs because
these two e↵ects interact: even a moderate quality (i.e., in true mean) alternative
4The single alternative contribution is stronger for the low variance set (i.e. x-markered lines in
Figure 4.5), which is expected since negatively biased signals from the single high variance alternative
is slow to self-correct. However, this di↵erence in the single alternative contribution is dominated
by the e↵ect of including additional alternatives into beliefs on the high variance set.
5This reflects a simple statistical phenomenon. For example, the expected belief from single trials
of two zero mean, unit variance alternatives is greater than zero since the probability of positive
belief on at least one alternative is 3/4.
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Figure 4.5: Belief decomposition
(a) Low variance set decomposition



















(b) High variance set decomposition



















within the high variance set may contribute a large diversity e↵ect (i.e., its inclusion
raises maximal belief significantly) because positive signals self-correct to aspiration
levels, not actual quality. In contrast, within the low variance set, inclusion of addi-
tional alternatives contributes little to maximal beliefs since measurements on these
alternatives are (by definition) not noisy. This is confirmed by the triangle-markered
line in 4.5a.
4.4 Sensitivity Analyses
In this section, we conduct sensitivity analyses for the main results (e.g., Figure
4.1b). In particular, we examine sensitivity along the two key dimensions of firms’
behavior in the model: their beliefs and their firm’s strategies.
4.4.1 Sensitivity to belief formation
We examine sensitivity of our main results to the means by which firms form
beliefs. Recall earlier that our main model makes the assumption, frequently seen
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in bandit model applications, that agents employ average updating to form beliefs
(see 4.2). Here, we employ a constant updating heuristic (e.g., see Sutton and Barto,
1998) given by:
qi,t =  ri,t + (1   )qi,t 1 (4.5)
While, with average updating, the impact of rewards on beliefs declines with
successive trials of a given alternative, the impact remains the same with constant
updating. As such, the constant updating heuristic is well-suited to nonstationary
environments.6
Figure 4.6: Sensitivity of performance risk to belief formation heuristic
(a) Pre-problem (t=50)




















(b) Post-problem (t = 52)



















Under constant updating, firms exhibit less performance risk, both pre- and post-
problem emergence, when recent rewards have a higher impact on beliefs (see Figure
4.6). The intuition underlying both cases is that reduced performance risk arises from
6Strictly speaking, the environment we model is nonstationary, but we only introduce shock at
one time interval, as opposed to a turbulent environment where change is more pervasive. As such,
average updating is a relatively sensible choice for our model.
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negative signals on recently selected high variance alternatives, which diminishes the
perceived quality high variance alternatives relative to low variance alternatives. In
contrast, under average updating, a recent negative signal has a more limited e↵ect on
beliefs since its contribution is diluted by prior trials on the corresponding alternative.
We focus first on performance risk prior to the emergence of a problem. As seen in
Figure 4.6a, firms have less performance risk with constant updating as compared to
average updating, and performance risk decreases when recent rewards are weighted
more heavily in forming beliefs (i.e., as   increases). To understand this, we focus on
the set of high variance alternatives. Recall from the main results that performance
risk is driven by the net e↵ects of inexperience (from variance in mean quality across
alternatives chosen) and selection (from noise variance within alternatives chosen).
Pre-problem inexperience risk is driven by exploration, which is fairly constant across
di↵erent belief formation mechanisms. As such, we focus on the di↵erential e↵ects of
belief formation on selection risk.
Selection risk – that is, variance in selected alternatives – is lower for constant
updating than average updating because the more that beliefs reflect recent trials,
the less likely it is for high variance alternatives to be selected. To see why this
is so, we examine how the frequency of high variance trials evolves over time. For
convenience, we reproduce the corresponding result from the main analysis (Figure
4.3b) side-by-side with the result for   = 0.2 in Figure 4.7.
For average updating, the tendency against selecting high variance alternatives is
driven mostly by early negative signals, which leads firms to believe the corresponding
alternative is worse than it really is and in turn inhibits self-correction through future
trials (see Figure 4.7a). Early positive signals, on the other hand, lead a firm to believe
an alternative is better than it really is and therefore continue self-correction through
repeated trials. Moreover, subsequent negative signals have little impact on biasing
beliefs downward because later trials have a smaller e↵ect on beliefs, as discussed
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Figure 4.7: Pre-problem evolution of high variance trials
(a) Average updating
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(b) Constant updating,   = 0.2

































positive, t = 5
positive, t = 50
negative, t = 5
negative, t = 50
above.
In contrast, the bias against selecting high variance alternatives is driven by both
early negative and early positive signals, making apparent risk aversion stronger.
While early negative signals operate much in the same manner as the average updating
case, early positive signals di↵er markedly, as seen by the circle-markered line in
Figure 4.7b, which suggests alternatives with early positive signals also exhibit a
negative belief bias over time. The reason for this is that early positive signals do
not carry the “inertia” that they do in the average updating case for insulating an
alternative against downward belief biases from later negative signals: indeed, beliefs
on any (high variance) alternative can be strongly biased by subsequent negative
signals because their e↵ects do not diminish over time.
We now focus attention on post-problem performance risk (Figure 4.6b). At a
basic level, we see that performance risk is qualitatively similar to average updat-
ing case. Two observations are worth noting, and will be discussed below: (a) the
inflection point at which exploration increases risk di↵ers (and is lowest for  = 2)
and (b) performance risk decreases as the impact of recent trials on beliefs increases
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(i.e., increasing  ). the Since post-problem inexperience risk is relatively invariant
to belief formation (at low exploration, it is largely driven by early random selection
of alternatives, and at higher exploration, it is very low), we can restrict attention
to the e↵ects of belief formation heuristics on selection risk (i.e., from noise variance
within alternatives chosen).
Post-problem selection risk is driven by the same underlying mechanisms as pre-
problem selection risk, though its manifestation di↵ers. In particular, an increase
in the importance of recent trials to belief formation weakens the aspiration e↵ect,
where, as discussed in Section 4.3.1.3, increasingly superior alternatives uncovered
from exploration sets a higher “bar” at which subsequently selected alternatives cease
to self-correct. Alternatives tend to fall further below aspiration levels when recent
trials have a larger impact on beliefs, which can be illustrated with a numerical ex-
ample. Suppose aspiration level (i.e., highest belief outside of a focal alternative) is
2, and the belief on a focal alternative that has been selected several times is 2.1.
Under average updating (or small   in constant updating), the next trial on the focal
alternative has little impact on its belief, so it drops to at worst (for example) 1.9
and ceases to self-correct. As the most recent trial increases in importance, however,
the next trial has a large impact on beliefs, so the drop is potentially much higher
(to 1.0, for example).7
As such, the net e↵ect of   on post-problem selection risk (and performance risk)
is a combination of aspiration e↵ect weakening, which tends to be stronger at low
exploration levels and higher  , and the aspiration e↵ect itself, which is stronger at
high exploration levels. This explains observations (a) and (b) noted above.
7Since post-problem risk preference is driven by di↵erentials in beliefs of high and low variance
alternatives, a second possible driver of post-problem risk seeking is a decrease in beliefs on low
variance alternatives. This decrease in beliefs is more acute at low  because convergence to true
values of superior low variance alternatives is slow in the first few trials (and indeed initially slower
than with average updating).
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4.4.2 Sensitivity to strategy
We examine sensitivity of the results to the search strategy employed by firms.
Under the ✏-greedy strategy used in the main analysis, choices believed to be near-
best and choices believed to be the worst are selected with equal probability. One
obvious extension of this to weight selection probability continuously according to its
perceived merit, and these types of choice mechanisms are known as softmax strate-
gies. The most common implementation of the softmax strategy utilizes a Boltzmann








wheremi is the probability of selecting alternative i, qi is the belief on alternative i, ⌧ is
a strategy parameter reflecting extent of exploration, and ⌧S scales ⌧ for convenience.
✏-greedy and softmax di↵er qualitatively in how they explore di↵erent alterna-
tives, so there is no exact equivalence from a given setting of the ✏ parameter to the
⌧ parameter in the ✏-greedy and softmax strategies. Nevertheless, for the purposes of
comparison, we define the extent of exploration as the fraction of times that an alter-
native chosen di↵ers from the one chosen in the prior period. Thus, any ✏/⌧ parameter
setting for ✏-greedy/softmax can be mapped to a level of exploration. In this section,
exploration parameters across the two strategies are mapped (or interpolated) to an
exploration level according to Table 4.1.
We first examine sensitivity of performance risk to strategy prior to the emergence
of a problem, as shown in Figure 4.8a. Since inexperience component of performance
risk reflects exploration level across the two strategies, and is therefore nearly identical
in both cases, we may focus on selection risk (i.e., noise variance within each selected
alternative) as the driver of this increase.
As the figure suggests, the process leading to risk aversion under softmax is quali-
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Table 4.1: Translation tables from ✏/⌧ to exploration level









































tatively similar that in the ✏-greedy strategy, the latter of which is described in Section
4.3. Nonetheless, the modest increase in selection risk (or decrease in risk aversion) at
intermediate exploration levels reflects the notion that, as discussed above, softmax
departs from ✏-greedy by selecting superior, but currently not believed to the best,
alternatives more frequently than inferior (and not believed to be the best) alterna-
tives. As such, we would expect the the alternative that is actually the best, 50% of
which are in the low and high variance set, to be identified more reliably by softmax,
which would tend to counter the risk aversion process.
We now turn attention to performance risk after the emergence of a problem, as
shown in Figure 4.8b. Since post-problem inexperience risk is relatively invariant to
strategy (in both cases, it is largely driven by early random selection of alternatives
at low exploration levels and it is low at high exploration), we can restrict attention
to the e↵ects of strategy on selection risk (i.e., from noise variance within alternatives
chosen).
Figure 4.8: Sensitivity of performance risk to strategy
(a) Pre-problem (t=50)
















(b) Post-problem (t = 52)
















Figure 4.8b shows that selection (and performance) risk is lower for softmax, par-
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ticularly at higher levels of exploration. However, our basic result still holds: beyond
some level of exploration, performance risk increases with increased anticipatory ex-
ploration. In the discussion below, we explain these results by focusing on non-modal
alternatives since the modal alternative cannot be selected after the emergence of a
problem.
Post-problem selection (and hence performance) risk is the net result of two ef-
fects. First, in comparison to ✏-greedy, softmax beliefs on the best (non-modal) low
variance alternative are higher and increase more with exploration, which tends to
drive down post-problem selection risk. This is a reflection of softmax favoring – and
hence self-correcting – higher quality alternatives, whereas in ✏-greedy, high quality
alternatives are on equal footing with inferior alternatives once they are not perceived
to be best. Second, an additional decline post-problem selection risk arise because
beliefs on high variance arms are lower for the softmax strategy. This in turn is a
consequence of the aspiration e↵ect increasing over time (it must since higher quality
alternatives are uncovered over time) and the softmax strategy sifting through non-
modal alternatives more quickly than the ✏-greedy strategy. As Figure 4.9 indicates,
the best non-modal high variance alternative is, on average, selected considerably
sooner in softmax than in ✏-greedy, which is consistent with analyses indicating faster
convergence of the softmax algorithm under suitable conditions (White, 2012).
4.5 Discussion
Why is organizational adaptation to problems risky? Common wisdom would
suggest that the adoption of new alternatives with which a firm has little knowledge
comes inherently with risk. Extant research has confirmed this notion through more
thorough examinations from a variety theoretical lenses such as behavioral theories of
the firm (March, 1991) and evolutionary economics (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).
While it seems obvious that anticipatory exploration across the space of alternatives
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Figure 4.9: Time periods when best (non-modal) high variance alternatives chosen
(a) First time



























would decrease the risk associated with adaptation to future problems, we argue in
this study that this intuition is not completely correct. While, consistent with the pre-
ceding intuition, this exploration augments the knowledge that guides firms towards
selecting good alternatives and avoiding poor ones, we find that this exploration also
biases firms towards the selection of risky solutions to problems.
In so doing, we contribute to understanding the di↵erent forms of risk associated
with problem-driven organizational change. This is particularly salient when the
two forms of risk examined in this study – that due to an insu cient breadth of
knowledge and that due to endogenous risk seeking – have dramatically di↵erent
implications for the firm. Consider our earlier example of a pharmaceutical firm
whose leading drug is found to have an unacceptable side e↵ect. In solving this
problem, the firm might be willing to accept the fact that low anticipatory exploration
leaves the firm vulnerable to volatile experimentation across replacement drugs that
vary in performance. However, the pharmaceutical firm might be far more concerned
about higher volatility within the replacement drug that, according to our findings, is
potentially caused by higher levels of anticipatory exploration. That is, the firm might
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not be willing to accept the maladaptive consequences of endogenous risk seeking,
where it has a high chance of selecting a single drug whose performance, irrespective
of its mean performance, has high variance across di↵erent patients (e.g., a single
wrongful death from a drug trial might have drastic repercussions for the firm). A
promising line of future work would be to further analyze the asymmetric implications





Toy Model of Collaboration
To illustrate the learning and information revealing e↵ects of knowledge contribut-
ing e↵orts to collaboration, I present a toy model of collaboration in which ex-post
innovations from collaborating firms engage in Cournot competition in the market for
innovations. The primary intent is to show that, under this model, profit-maximizing
firms with minimal limits on information are su cient to produce the hypothesized
results.
For ease of exposition, I assume two firms A and B where, without loss of gen-
erality, A exerts higher e↵ort in contributing knowledge, as in Figure 3.2, for the
calculated example (though I assume many firms for the formulation). I assume
e↵ort is a monotonic function of each firm’s expected gains from the collaboration
(which are exogenously given). Each firm’s information limitation is that it has no
(ex-ante) knowledge on other firm’s expected gains nor do firms know the underlying
distribution of expected gains.
Focusing on complementary gains to knowledge production (and thus ignoring ad-







Conceptually, this can be considered a knowledge pool that firms may draw upon
given some ability to do so. For two firms this is simply given by KCOL = eAeB. I
assume a linear inverse demand function:
D 1 = a  bQ (A.2)
where Q is the total quantity of innovations produced by firms in the collaboration.
To simplify, I assume quantities are scaled so that b = 1. The performance of firm i’s
innovations, ⇡i, is given by:
⇡i = qi(D
 1 + vi) (A.3)
where qi is the quantity and vi is the (cost-adjusted) quality of firm i’s innovations
that build on collaborative knowledge KCOL. Here, we assume for simplicity that
innovation is costless, but that collaborative knowledge can be exploited by a firm to
achieve a “negative” cost in the form of enhanced quality.
We further decompose quality vi = vKi +v
O
i , where v
K
i represents the quality gained
through firm i’s e↵ort contributing to the collaboration and vOi is the quality gained
through observing other firm’s e↵orts contributing to the collaboration. vKi reflects
both a firm’s ex-post incentives to innovate based on perceived quality of the collab-
orative output and a firm’s capability to utilize collaborative output (which should
increase with e↵ort). vOi can thus be considered adjustments along these two dimen-
sions through observing other firms: observation may reveal the underlying quality
of the collaborative output and the capabilities beneficial to utilize the collaborative
knowledge.
In this study, I theorize e↵ort contributing knowledge gives firms a context to in-
teract with other firms and in e↵ect realize potential collaborative knowledge benefits.
113
I model this by making collaborative gains increase (at a diminishing rate) with e↵ort
bounded above by KCOL, i.e., vKi = eiKCOL/(ei + 1). For two firms, this reduces to
vKA = e
2





Moreover, I theorize e↵ort by firms may reveal to other firms the underlying
value of collaborative knowledge (or capabilities that enable a firm to benefit from
this underlying value). Following prior work (Türüt and Ofek, 2012), we assume
asymmetry in revealed information: high e↵ort reveals more accurate information
than low e↵ort. This is sensible in that the process of contributing more knowledge
to a contribution should give a firm a more accurate assessment of the potential
embodied in the collaboration, and under the assumption knowledge flows exclusively
from more knowledgeable to less knowledge firms (Jovanovic and Rob, 1989; Jovanovic
and MacDonald, 1994; Knott et al., 2009), we might expect higher e↵ort firms to











1, x > 0
0, x  0
and the squared term captures the sensible notion that the visibility of the signal
exhibits increasing returns. For the two firm case in the example, this reduces to
vOA = 0 and v
O
B = (eA   eB)2.
Substituting Equation A.2 into Equation A.3 and solving first-order conditions,
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(A.5)
Equations A.4 and A.5 may be inserted into Equation A.3 to determine perfor-
mance of A’s innovations as a function of eA and eB. To illustrate, Figure A.1 graphs
the performance of A as a function of eA for a = 2 and eB = 0.5. Note that perfor-
mance increases initially as firm A learns from contributing knowledge, but at higher
levels, the information revealing e↵ect dominates, and performance declines, consis-
tent with the theory in this study. Moreover, A’s performance increases with e↵ort
to a point somewhat past B’s e↵ort level (eA ' 0.8), which conforms to the intuition
that others’ e↵ort serves as a signal only when it is “noticeably” larger than own
e↵ort.
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